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THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
TRANSMITTING, 
In compliance, in part, with a resolution of the Senate, a report from the 
Secretary of War respecting the defences of the country. 
DECEMBER 13, 1841. 
Read, and ordered to be printed. 
To the Senate of the United States : 
I transmit herewith a report from the War Department, in compliance with 
so much of the resolution of the Senate, of March 3, 1841, respecting the 
. military and naval defences of the country, as relates to the defences under 
the superintendence of that Departinent. 
JOHN TYLER. 
WASHINGTON, December 7, 1841. 
DEPARTMENT OF w AR, 
December 6, 1841.. 
Sm: On the 3d of March, 1841, a r.esolution was adopted by the Se;ate, 
reqµesting the President of the United States to cause to be laid' before the-
Senate at the commencement of the (then) next session of Congress, reports 
upon the military and naval defences of the country, which were required to 
imbody various information upon the subjects specified in the resolution. 
Upon. entering on the discharge of the , duties of the -Department, , I found 
that a report in compliance with the resolution, had been prepared by my'" 
immediate .predecessor. Concun~ng, generally, in the yiews it contains, and 
:finding nothing upon which I am prepared at this time to express any differ-
ent opinion, it has appeared to me equally j~st and respectful to the gentle-
man, who has obviously devoted much' tinie and consideration to the subject, 
to submit the report thus prepared as that of the Department. A copy of the 
• record of it, in this offiGe, is therefore transmitted herewith; as the answer to 
so much of the resolution of the Senate as relates to the military defences of 
the country. · 
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 
JOHN C. SPENCER. · 
To the PRESIDENT of the United States. 
Thomas Allen, print. 
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DEPARTMENT OF WAR, August 30, 1841. 
Sm: I have the honor to submit the accompanying reports from the offi-
cers at the head of the corps of military engineers, aind the Ordnance De-
partment, respectively, on the several points connected with the public defence, 
embraced in the resolution of the Senate of the 3d day of March last, and 
,. which are, at the same time, within the, superintendence of this. Depart-
ment. 
The views and plans presented in these papers, are fully sustained and 
approved by the report of a board composed of the most distinguished and 
able officers in the service, made under the direction of this Department, and 
in compliance with a resolution of the Senate on the 9th day of May, 1840. 
The well-considered opinions of experienced and scientific gentlemen, upon 
subjects within the line of a profession which, it is well known, that no high 
degree of skill or competency can be attained without a particular course of 
study and observation, are entitled to gi:eat weight; and none of inferior 
knowledge of the subject, and who desires the national safety and honor, 
will venture to oppose them without diffidence. 
By reference to the report which I had the honor to submit at the com-
mencement of the present session of Congress, it will be perceived that the 
approval and recommendation of the plan and estimates for the military de-
fences of the country, then presented by the Chief Engineer, and which do 
not vary materially from those now brought forward by the same officer, were 
limited to those works which were supposed to be indispensable to what might 
})e considered a good state of defensive preparations for war, and which might 
be completed in a reasonable time. To secure this limited object, it was 
estimated that an expenditme of $9,&73,547 would be required for the con-
struction and repair of fortifications on the Atlantic and Gulf coast, and 
$2,493,000 for their appropriate armament. The expenditure of the further 
sum of $2,112,500 for the defence of the Southern: and $895,000 for the 
Western frontiers, ought to have been included, which would have made the 
whole expenditure for the construction and repairs of fortifications, recom-
mended by the Department, $13,751,047. In the opinion of the Chief En-
gineer, as will appear from his report, a proper system of defence for the At-
lantic_ and Gulf coast-a system which will give due security to all the impor-
tant and ~xposed points-will require a still further expenditure of $19,521,-
824 for the construction of an additional class of works, and $3,735,330 
for their armament, making an aggregate of expenditure for this class, amount-
ing to $23,257,154. 
It appears from the report of the 9th of May, 1840, before referred to, that 
there has been expended in the construction and repairs of works already com-
pleted: or under construction, and constituting part of the system recom-
mendeu by the Chief Engineer, the sum of $ 13,323,828. If, therefore, the 
entire system of land defences recommended in the report of the Chief En-
~neer, for the pr~tection of a frontier, inland and maritime, of upward of 
eight thousand miles extent, should be adopted and carried out, the expendi-
tme upon the several works will have been $45,449,699, and for the arma-
ment $6,228,370, making a grand total of $51,677,929. This appears to be 
a large sum to be expended upon fo1tifications; and the country is not pre-
pared to ap:pr~ve a ~st~m of public defence upon so extended and costly a 
~ale; y~t, it 1s but Just.Ice to the patriotic and intelligent officers who urge 
its adoption, to rema_r~, that the aggregate expenditure proposed by them, 
exceeds, by a few millions only, the public revenue for the single year of 
3 
1836 nor do·es it exceed double the amount o{ the· an~ual ,revenue from lli~ 
,usual sources_, when the country is in a condition of _ordinary prosp~r!ty. A 
far 'greater amount has been expended upon many smgle harbors, c1t1es, ~n,d 
,other points of militar~ i1!1portance in the old -~orld. T~e defence~ of th_e 
city of Q,uebec, the pnh·c1pal fortress of the Bnt1sh P?s~ess10ns on. t~iS contr1-
nent it is believed cannot have cost less than ten m1lhons; .and 1t 1s stated 
upo~ respectable au'thority that the Cabanas, the principal fort erected for the 
protection of the harbor and city of Havana, in Cuba, cost the _Governme~t 
of Spain sixty millions of dollars! It is also proper to state, that the cost _of 
the entire system of permanent and fixed, defences presented by the (:h1ef 
Engineer, is decidedly more moderate than that of other plans of nat10n~l 
-d~fence, which can claim the _s~ppor_t of names of ~istin_ction i~ the ~ilitary 
history of the country. A d1stmgmshed officer, high m command m tiie 
_ .army, has for y-ears earnestly pressed upon the attention of Congress and the 
public, a system of defence by railroads and floating batteries, naving un-
doubtedly much to recommend it; yet, if adopted and executed in all its 
·parts, would require an expenditure much greater than the system presented 
·in the accompanying report. · 
Nevertheless, I do not consider it wise or expedient, so far in advance of 
, the period when a Js1-rge portion of the new works projected andrecomm end-
~~d can be construcfed, to assume that they will continue to be necessary and 
proper. That will depend greatly upon the improvements now being made 
in the application of existing inventions to 'war purposes, and of others tnat 
may be rationally expected to be made in the meantime. 'A period of ten 
years has become sufficient, in point of duration, to mark an epoch in the 
onward progress of modem invention and improvement. Even five years 
may modify, materially, plans of defencB now reputed wisest and most in-
;dispensable. But these anticipations of the future should not deter those 
who·are now charged with the high trust of providing for the national we1-
-fare and security, from the adoption and vigorous execution of the system of 
,-defence deemed most effective for the present, at least so far as to cover the 
-approaches to all our most important commercial and naval depots. 'I'o tnjs 
extent I insisted, in a former report from this Department, upon the necessifr 
of conforming to the recommendations of the Chief Engineer. I still aa-
here to the opinion then expressed on this point, leaving it exclusively to 
those who shall have charge of the subject hereafter; and when the question 
-shall properly arise, to~ecide whether the system shall be completed, by die 
construction of all the works enumerated in the accompanying report, or 
whether some other and better plan of national defence may not, with advan-
tage, be substituted for it. 
But, from causes not necessary to be explained, fortifications and extrava-
gance have, in popular estimation, become synonymous terms, and an im-
pres~ion prevails with many that such works, even upon the,limited scale 
recommended by this Department, are comparatively useless; hence the 
country is prone to embrace any new theory which holds out tlie promise 
•of greater economy with any degree of efficie:ncy. , 'Since the :recent ~~d 
successful experiments in the navigation of the Atlantic by steam, · and the 
consequent changes anticipated in maritime warfare, it is not an uncom-
mon impression that fortifications, and all other land defenc~s, may be dis-
pensed with altogether; and that the navy, inw'roved and strengthened b-y 
war-steamers and floating batteries, may be safely and exclusively relied 
upon for the defence of our extensive seacoast. Another error, not less to 
' . .. 
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be regretted, has obtained some hold upon the public mind since the exten-
~ion of steam navigation, already adverted to, and the improvements lately 
.~uggested in the means of defending the seaboard. It is, that the defence· 
of our numerous inlets, harbors, and naval depots will, by these improve-
ments, be rendered not only more certain and easy, but less expensive than 
heretofore, and, therefore, of diminished importance in every point of view. 
The very reverse of these conclusions, it may be . justly apprehended, will 
be realized in the experience of the future. The increased facilities which 
the late extension of steam navigation will give to any great maritime 
Power, holding possession of one or more naval depots on this·side of the 
. Atlantic, in concentrating a large naval or military force upon any one of 
the numerous assailable points upon our extensive seacoast-the celerity 
of movement, and the greater certainty and precision which will be thereby 
.secured in the execution of all the details of an attack, enabling an enemy 
to make it, in every instance, a surprise-will probably create .a necessity 
for increasing our defences in some form, at an expense far exceeding any-
thing heretofore deemed important or necessary to reasonable security. To · 
provide adequate defences for every exposed point, may become so great a 
tax upon the resources of the country that it may come to be regarded a 
less evil to leave the largest portion of our coast at the mercy of an enemy, 
and to apply our whole disposable means to bring to bear upon it. But 
the prospect of successful defence, by the navy alone, vanishes altogether 
when we reflect that it is only in infancy, and that for a long time it must 
be inferior to the naval armaments of several of the Powers of Europe. 
Whether the United States will be able, at any time, to contend with them 
upon the ocean, it is obvious will depend upon the successful development of 
our naval resources after the commencement of a war; but how could this 
development take place ·in the face of a much more powerful enemy, if our 
depots and navy-yards are suffered to remain without adequate protection 
by fortifications, and there are no harbors in which our ships of war may 
take refuge, and remain in safety when pursued by superior squadrons? 
It would be fatal to the national honor to neglect to fortify sufficiently and 
amply those passes, by land and water, by which an enemy could approach 
:the depositories of our naval supplies, and also the principal harbors of 
.easy access to our own vessels. 
The necessary quality of buoyancy in war-steamers and floating bat-
teries r~quires that they should be constituted mainly of wood; and whether 
of wood or iron, their destructibility, by the usual missiles employed in war, 
will be neither greater nor less than that of the war-steamers and floating bat-
teries, with which an enemy may attack them . . It is clear, then, that 
nothing will be gained by their exclusive employment, in this point o( 
view. It is equally clear that if an enemy is able to concentrate a much 
· superior force upon any one of our great harbors and naval depots than is 
provided for its defence, he must, wit~out some extraordinary casualty, be 
.successful. To guard, therefore, agamst the capture or destruction of all 
our opulent cities and great naval depots upon the seaboard, the Govern-
ment must provide a greater number of war-steamers and :floating batteries, 
for tlte defence of each of tltem, than any foreign nation will probably be 
al;>le to assemble. upon our coast, and thus have it in his power, by uniting 
- his whole force m nn attack upon one point at a time to lay under contri-
uti n or dcstr y the whol . ' 
But s pposc each f o_ur great harbors or depots should be thus defended, 
5 [2] 
and that all the channels or passes by water could be' so guarded and blocked 
up by :floating batteries, or with the advantages of position to set at defiance 
any naval force which could be brought to the attack, without fortifications 
to guard the passes or avenues over which an enemy could reach his objeot-
by land, what would prevent him from disembarking a su:ffici~nt land force 
at some other, but not distant point, upon the coast and effecting all his pur-
poses of spoliation and destruction? It is manifest that something more wilt 
be wanting than war-steamers and floating batteries to give even tolerable 
security to our cities and naval depots. If fortifications are to be dispensed 
with, it is clear, that to affor'd them adequate protection and security against' 
the sudden assaults of an enemy approaching by sea, wilL require, not only 
such a preparation of war-steamers and floating batteries as already described,. 
but a stationary land force sufficient in numbers and discipline to resist any 
number of veteran troops the ene·my might have it in his power to employ 
as an auxiliary force in hi~ enterprises upon our shores. 
Supp9sing the defences of a harbor, by fortifications, to be complete, and 
the attacking ships or war-steamers of an enemy shall have succeeding in 
passing the outer channels leading to it, without material damage from the 
forts designed to guard them ; or if they shall have taken advantage of the 
darkness of the night, and passed them unobserved, they will have gained 
but little by that success. They will be exposed at every point within, to 
· the fire of one or more forts or land-batteries. They will be able to find no 
anchorage or resting-place where they will not be liable to be disabled, burnt, 
or blown up, by the shells and hot shot discharged under protection of walls, 
impenetrable to the shot of an ~nemy, except at the gun ports. Not so, 
however, when floating defences are exclusively relied upon. They will 
have no advantage in the fight over the attacking force--they will be equally 
exposed and combustible; and when once overcome, all resistance ceases, 
and the success of the enemy will be complete. 
On the question of the relative efficiency and cheapness of defences by for-
tifications or fixed batteries and by ships of wa::.- and :(loating batteries, several 
points deserve conside1'.ation. . 
The comparative efficiency of guns in forts and on board ships orwar or 
floating batteries when brought into action as antagonist forces, has been vari-
ously estimated, but the results of experience seem to jµstify the opinion, 
that one gun in a fort, advantageously situated, is equal to ten on ·board an 
attacking squadron of ships of war. The relative expense of guns in forts 
and on board ships of war or floating batteries is not so great, but still stri-
kingly disproportionate. The most favorable estimate will show, that guns· 
afloat will cost, upon an average, a third more than the cost of guns in forts. 
W ell-constmcted forts, bearing any µumber of guns, may be erected at less 
than half the amount required to build good steam-batteries bearing the same 
number of guns. The steamships, now on the stocks at New York and 
Philadelphia, of 1,700 tons burden, and designed to carry only eight guM 
each, it is estimated, will cost $600,000 each. A floating batt~ry of the, 
largest class, contemplated by a distinguished advocate for that mode of har-
bor defence, carrying two hundred guns, with its tow-boats, it is estimated, 
cannot cost less than $1,400,000, and th€ smallest, parrying one hundred 
and twenty guns, not less than $700,000. A ship of the line, carrying 
eighty g_uns, it is estimated, will cost, without her armament, $500,000 .. Fort 
A~ams 1s constructed for four hundred and fifty-eight guns; when fimshed, 
will have cost $1,400,000. Forts are built of solid, and, for the most part. 
6 
cf imperishable materials. By proper care and a small annual expenditure for 
l'fil)airs, they will last and be available for centuries : while the cost of the 
re-pairs that ships of war and floating batteries will require, in eyery twelve or · 
:fit:teen years, will equal the cost of the original construction. In other words, 
:il)- respect to the expense, vessels of war and floating batteries will require to 
be reconstructed every twelve or fifteen years. The injury done to fortifica-
tion~ in the most serious engagements can usually be repaired in a few days, 
or, at most, in a few weeks, while the damages to ships of war and float-
ing batteries, i:m a similar engagement, would require extensive repairs in 
every instance, and often renders them unworthy of repair. 
Upon these data, a satisfactory ·estimate may be made of the relative ex-
pense of the two. modes of defending our principal harbors and naval depots. 
In presenting these views, I would not be understood, by any means, as:-
disparaging the value and efficiency of war-steamers and floating batteries,. 
when employed as an auxiliary force in any system of coast or harbor de-
fence that may be adopted. Nor is any idea entertained that they ought, or: 
can, be altogether dispensed with. 
All which is respectfully submitted. 
JOHN BELL. 
To the PRESIDENT. 
( 
I 
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Report ef, the Chief Engineer in answer to the resolutions of the Senate 
- of March 3, 1841, respecting the defences ef. the co_,untry. 
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, Washington, July 1, 1841' 
·Sm,: l 'have the honor to submit the following remark~, in compliance 
wi!h your .directions, touching a series of resolutions of the Senate of the 3d 
of March last, requiring information in relation to various subjects connected-' 
w<ith the ,national defences, and calling -for a report on such portions of these 
resolutions as belong to this department. 
Most of the information required by the resolutions, in relation to the per-
manent defences, will be found in a report made by a board of officers to the 
Secretary of War, 23d April, 1840 (see Senate document 451, 1st session, 
26th Congress). This document may be further referred to as giving, in 
detail, much information in relation to the system of national defence ; and 
from it is, drawn the greater portion of what will be found imbodied in the 
following report. -
Northern frontier. 
This frontier extends, as described- by the terms of the resolutions, from 
Uaflrn Superior to Passamaquoddy bay, a distance of somewhat more than _ 
two thousand miles, binding all the way on the British American provinces. 
Whether we regard the strongly-marked · geographical features of this fron-
tier, presenting, as it does, for the most part, a chain of great lakes or inland 
seas, stretching along the border, the common property of two nations, and 
affording facilities for an extensive commerce, almost, rivalling that of the 
ocean itself; or, whether we look to the growing strength of ·our colonial 
neighbors, fostered by the im~ense power and resources of the mother-coun-
ry, its vast importance cannot fail to i.mpress us with the neGessity of being 
prepared, not only for defence along that line, but ~so to act offensively, 
with decisive effect, in the event of our being involved in a national conflict. 
From the peculiar character of this frontier, its defence must necessarily 
partake somewhat of the sy~tem applicable to the seacoast; for, ahhough it 
is denominated inland, in contradiction to the latter, it is, nevertheless, mari-
time in many of its features, and must be . treateq accordingly for p,urpo,ses of 
defence. 
So important is the mastery on the lakes, in any military operations in tµat 
quarter, that it is scarcely to be doubted that, in the event of a war, ther,e 
will be some naval preparations on both sides, and a struggle for the ascend-
ency on those waters. ·whichever power shall acquire that, even temporarily, 
will have the means of assailing his adversary with gre·at effect <\long the 
shores of the lakes, in the abstmce of fortifications, by occupying the harbors, 
destroying the towns (some of which are fast advancing to the rank of cities), 
and controlling the commercial operations, of which those lakes constitute,. 
the principal channel. These considerations render it highly expedient, in-
deed necessary, to fortify the larger harbors on the lakes, as well as the mo.re 
imp~r~ant passes on the straits and rivers by which they are connected. 
Without entering fully into the military details of the subject, which might 
be ~eemed somewhat out of place here, regarding th~ object of the 'resolutions; 
which seems to look rather to the expense involved, the department will p,ro-
ceed _to enuz:ner~te the works of defence deemed necessary on the northern 
frontier, beg1?hrng a~ Lake Superior; merely glancing at the effects and ad-
vantages which are likely to result from the establishment of those works. 
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I. Fbrt at Falls of St. Mary.-A fort here will control the eommunica .. 
tion between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, and, at least, prevent an ene-
my from availing itself of it for purposes of communication, and for the 
transportation of supplies, if it does not secure those important advantages to 
us; which it would do, unless counteracted by a work on the British side of 
the line. In that event, almost certain to occur, it would be neutralized, 
but would still serve to cover and protect our settlements along the St. Mary, 
and form a rallying point for local defence in times of ala1m. 
Estimated expense of fort, barracks, &c. :. - · -
2. Fort at Michilimackinac.-Although this position is some-
what interior, it is regarded of high importance from its geo-
graphical relations. A fort here, in- conjunction with float-
ing batteries, may be made to command, effectually, the ap-
proach to Lake Michigan, and shut out an enemy who might 
possess a naval ascendency on Lake Huron; thus protecting 
the entire circumference of Lake Michigan from attacks to 
which it would otherwise be exposed, even from a small 
force, and securing it to ourselves, as a safe channel of com-
munication with the rich and productiv~ States in the rear, 
whose shores it washes. 
Estimated expense - -;:_ , 
3. Fort at the foot of Lake Huron.-A work here will con-
trol the outlet of Lake Hmon, and interrupt the navigation 
between that and Lake St. Clair and the river Detroit. It 
will serve, also, to cover the settlements on that part of the 
frontier, and form a rallying point for the neighboring militia 
for local defence. 
Estimated expense -
4. Fort and barrack establishment at Detroit.-In the event 
of war, Detroit would undoubtedly be a point of consider-
able concentration of troops, not merely for the defence of 
that portion of the frontier, but for such offensive opera-
tions as might be deemed expedient in that quarter. It 
·maybe reo-arded as the centre of the upper section of the 
northern frontier, and has important relations, both geo-
graphical and military. Although true policy would, in 
such a case, dictate that our chief efforts should be direct-
ed against the vital points of the enemy's possessions as 
low down the line as practicable, still it might become 
expedient, with a view to distract his attention and divide 
his forces, to menace him above ; and this is one of the 
points from which he might be assailed by minor expedi-
tions, especially if he should relax his measures of defence, 
in looking to his safety elsewhere. 
Estimated expense of barracks for one regiment, 
including site - - - - $150,000 
Estimated expense of fort at Sprino- Wells, in-
cluding site - - . -
0 
- _ 100,000 
5. Fielclrwork and barrack e tabli !iment at or near Buffalo. 
::r'he wealth ~n~ commercia~ _imp?rtance of Buffalo, and 
~ts clo e prox~m1~y to the British line, will make it an ob-






presence of a respectab_le force there. It m~y also beco:111e 
a point of concentration_ of !roops for. mmor ~ffens1ve 
movements, by way of d1vers10n _; and 1s thus, 1~ every 
view entitled to seasonable attention. An extensive bar-
rack-~stablishment, together with batteries and such field-
works as might be thrown up at brief notice, would be 
sufficient. 
Estimated expense - - - - - -
6. Fort Niagara to be re~uilt.-A_ f~rt at_ t~is po_sition is im-
portant, on th·e assumption_ (adm1ttmg, 1t 1s believed, of but 
little doubt) that, in time of war, there would be some na-
val preparations on Lake Ontario. It commands the en-
trance into the Niagara river; and a work here will shut 
the enemy's vessels out from that harbor, yrhile it will 
afford protection under which ours may take shelter in 
case of need. , 
Estimated expense for repairs of buildings, and new bar-
racks there 
7. Fort at Oswego.-The growing importance of Oswego, 
the relation it bears to the great line of internai commu-
nication to the west, and its exposed situation, directly on 
the shore of the lake, whence it might be assailed by armed 
vessels without the co-operation of a land attack, call for 
works of defence to protect the harbor, and thus secure a safe. 
retreat for our vessels in case of need, while we shut out 
those of the enemy. Besides, this place possesses many 
advantages for naval preparations for vessels not of great 
draught of water, and would probably be made a subordi-
nate depot in time of war. 
Estimated expense for barracks, quarters, storehouses, and 
magazine 
8. Fort at Sackett's I-Iarbor.-In the event of naval arma- · 
ments to any considerable extent being resorted to on 
Lake Ontario, Sackett's Harbor, from its bold water~ and 
its excellence as a harbor, would at once become a depot 
of great importance, the safety of which should be en.sured 
against the enterprises of the enemy, by the timely con-
struction of appropriate works of defence. Situated di-
rectly opposite to the strong point of Kingston, on the 
Canadian side, and adjacent to the head of the St. Law-
rence, it is one of the points at which a concentration of 
troops may become expedient for the defence of that por-
tion of the frontier and the protection of the naval depot. 
The barrack accommodations already established there 
are deemed sufficient, and it remains to fortify the ap-
prouch to the harbor. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks, within 
9. Fort at the narrows of the St. Lawrence, below Ogdens-
burg.-The chief object of a work here would be to cut 
off the enemy's communication by the river, between 
Montreal and Kingston, and thus prevent him from avail-







and supplies, if we cannot entirely secure it to ourselves. 
By this obstruction on the. St. Lawrence, he would be 
thrown altogether upon his back line of communication 
by the Ottowa, which, although it has the merit of being 
more secure from interruption, is longer, and more diffi-
cult, especially in seasons of drought. This would a]so 
be another point from which the enemy might be men-
aoed; and from which auxiliary movements might be 
made, in aid of the chief attack. 
Estimated expense of fort and barracks - - -
10. Fbrt near the line on Lake Cliamplain.-A work here 
may be made to command the pass of the lake, and is 
considered by far the most important of any proposed on 
the whole line of frontier. 
The position of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar. 
While Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior stretch their 
whole length directly along the border (forming, in fact, the 
boundary), Champlain extends deeply into our territory, at 
right angles with the line of the frontier ; and, while its 
southern extremity reaches almost to the Hudson, it finds 
its outlet, to the north, in the St. Lawrence, nearly midway 
between Montreal and Quebec, the two great objects of at-
tack. This is u,ndoubtedly the avenue by which the Brit-
ish possessions may be most effectually assailed; while, at 
the same time, it would afford to the enemy possessing a 
naval ascendency, equal facilities for bringing the war with-
in our own borders, if it be left unfortified.. It therefore 
becomes ii)lportant to fortify a point as near the line as prac-
ticable, so as to shut out the enemy's vessels, and thus ef-
fect the deuble object of protecting the interior shores of the 
lake from the predatory attacks to which they would other-
wise be exposed, and of Recuring it to ourselves, as the 
great channel by which our troops and supplies may be 
rapidly thrown forward to the poi1.1ts of attack or defence. 
For a permanent work on Stony point (New York), inclu-
ding purchase of site - - - - $300,000 
For a permanent work on Windmill point (Vt.), in-
cluding purchase of site - 300,000 
11. Barrack establishment and depot at Plattsburg.-In the 
event of war, Plattsburg will become the great depot for the 
operations on the Champlain frontier, the point of concen-
tration of troops preparatory to any offensive movements 
and the station of the reserve to sustain those movements' 
and the posts that may be established in advance. EveX: 
in ti~e of pe~ce, a respec!able force should be posted here, 
especially durmg the contmuance of the boundary question 
and border disturbances. Barracks for a regiment at least 
with suitable storehouses, are recommended to b; erected' 
on a plan admitting of extension, if required and also of 
s~itable def ive arrang ments. ' 
timate xp n e f ompleting the works in proo-ress on the 





12. From Lake Champlain, eastward, the geographical fea-
tures of the frontier materially change character, and re-
quire a corresponding modification of the means of defence. 
The line no longer intersects great lakes, admitting of naval 
preparations7 nor binds on straits . and rivers, the navigati~n 
of which may be controlled or interrupted by fortifications. 
It is altogether inland, until it reaches the St. Croix, where 
the principles that have been applied to other portions of 
the frontier similarly situated will again become applicable. 
·Running on a parallel of latitude to the Connecticut river, 
and thence along· a chain of highlands, not yet clearly de-
fined, to the province of New Brunswick, there are, per-
haps, no points immediately on the frontier sufficiently 
commanding, of themselves, to call, for the establishment 
and maintehance of fortifications, or works of defence. 
Should it ever become necessary to sustain, by force, our title 
to the territory now in dispute, it must be done, not by iso-
lated forts along the frontier, commanding, probably, nothing 
beyond the range of their own guns ; but by an aotive ar-
my, competent not.only to occupy the country and hold it, 
but also to assume the offensive, if necessary, and carry the 
war beyond our borders. 
But while it is· not deemed expedient to construct a chain of 
forts along this portion of the frontier, it is considered a 
proper measure of precaution, in the present state of our 
relations with the British provinces, that positions should 
be selected, and. preparatory arrangements made, for the es-
tablishment of depots of supplies at the head of navigation 
on the Kennebec and Penobscot. In the event of move-
ments in that' quarter, these would be proper points for the 
concentration of troops, and would serve as a base of opera-
tions, whether these should be offensive or defensive in 
their character. 
Estimated expense of storehouses and other accommodations 
13. Fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.-A work here, 
while it will serve to cover that part of the State of Maine 
from the attacks· to which it would otherwise be exposed, 
may, from its advanced positiqn, be made to act · an impor-
tant though indirect part in the defence of the more north-
ern portion of the frontier. Calais appears to be a very eli-
gible point for the concentration of troops, with reference to 
existing circumstances. A strong force stationed here, 
threatening the enemy's posts on the lower St. John's, and 
held ready to strike in that direction, in case of movements 
from New Brunswick toward the disputed territory, could 
not fail to have a decisive influence on such movements ; 
since it is obvious that they could not be made with safety, 
while exposed to attack in flank and rear, and to have their 
line of communication intercepted, and their depots seized, 
' b7 a prompt movement on our part from the St. Croix. 
Est1mat~d expense of fort and barracks 




lieved that, beside the defences which have been sug-
gested along the border, chiefly for purposes of local pro-
tection, there should be a great central station at some 
position in the interior at which troops might be assembled 
for instruction, and where they would still be within , 
supporting distance of the more exposed parts of the 
frontier. 
·Turning our views inland, in search of some single position 
at which preparations might be made for extended opera-
tions on this frontier, and from which aid and succor 
could always be speedily derived-some position which, 
while it shall be equally near to many important points 
of the enemy's possessions, shall afford at no time any in-
dication of the direction in which our efforts are to be 
made ; which will, if it be possible7 unite the opposite 
qualities of being at the same time remote and proximate, 
far as to distance, but near as to time; which, while it 
brings a portion of the military resources of the country 
to the support of the inland frontier, and places them in 
the best attitude for operations in that quarter, whether 
defensive or offensive, at the same time takes them not 
away from the seacoast. Looking for these various prop- . 
erties, we find them all united, in a remarkable degree, 
in the position of Albany. 
From this place by steamboat, canal-boat, or railroad car, 
troops and munitions could be transported in a short time 
to Buffalo, or onward to Detroit, to Oswego, tu Sackett's 
Harbor, to Plattsburg, to Boston, and along the coast of New 
England; to New York by steamboat now, and soon by rail-
road also; and thence onward to Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Washington, and the heart of the southern c01mtry, if 
necessary. In a word, Albany is a great central position, 
from which radiate the principal lines of communication 
to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west; and 
combines so many advantages for a military depot, that 
the expediency of occupying it, and thus availing our-
selves of those advantages, would seem to be manifest. 
Estimat~ expense of the purchase of land, and the construc-
tion of barracks and other buildings $300,000 
Total for northern frontier - 2,112,500 
Coast from Passamaquoddy Bay to Cape Florida. 
We will conduct the examination geographically, beginning at the north-
~as~ern ex~r~mity, and referring, in every case, to accompanying tables, 
~hich exh1b1t the several works in the order of relative importance ,as to 
tune. 
The eastern harbors of aine _are exposed in a peculiar manner. Th~y 
are n~t only on the flank of our lme, but they are also quite near the public 
establishments of the greatest of maritime powers. They are, moreover, as 
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yet, backed by only a thin population, and are, cons~quently, weak as ~ell 
as exposed. The time may not, however, be very distant when, beconung. 
wealthy and populous, they will be objects of a full portion of the national 
solicitude. Works designed for these harbors must, therefore, be calcu-
lated for the future--must be founded on the principle that they must de-
fend places much more important than any now existing there ; that, be-
ing near the possessions of a foreign power, they will be, i~ a particular· 
manner, liable to sudden and repeated attacks~ and that, lymg at the ex-
tremity of the coast, they are liable to be but tardily succored. The works 
must, consequently, be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out for a 
few days. Feebler works might be morP- injurious than beneficial : their-
weakness would, in tl:ie first place, invite attack; and, it being often a 
great advantage to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the · 
enemy could prepare himself to remedy the deficiencies of the forts, after 
they should fall into his hands, by adding temporary works, by providing 
strong garrisons, and by aiding the defence with his vessels. 
No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans form_ed for 
their defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much 
confidence is not asked for the mere conjectures presented below, as to the 
number and cost of the works assigned for the protection of ,the harbors 
which have not yet been surveyed. In some cases there may be mistakes 
as to the number of forts and batteries needed, in others errors will exist in 
the estimated cost. 
Eastport and Machias may be mentioned as places that will unques-
tionably be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of" 
. relative importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by. the Gov-
ernment. There are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island 
that may, at that period, deserve equal attention ; at present, however, the· 
places mentioned will be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be 
assumed as the cost at each.-(Statement l, table F.) 
Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot ba,r, having a 
capacious and close harbor, affording anchorage for the highest class or 
vessels, and easily accessible from sea, offers ·<! station for the navy of an 
enemy superior to any other on this part of the coast. From this point his 
cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of tJ..Je eastern 
coast, especially that of M11ine, and his enterprises could be conducted with 
great rapidity against any points · he might select. These considerations, 
added to the very great advantage, in certain political events, of our occu-
pying a naval station thus advanced, whence we might act offensively,. 
together with the expediency of providing places of succor on a part of the 
coast where vessels are so frequmtly perplexed in their navigation by the · 
prevailing fog_s, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong 
ID?,n~er, of this roadstead may, before long, be necessary. A survey of" 
this island was begun many years ago, but the, party being called off to 
other duties, it was never completed. 'I1he project of defensive works 'has 
not been made. The entire cost may be, as assumed by the Engineer 
Department some years ago, $5OO,OOO.-(~tatement I, table F,) 
Castine.-It would seem to be impossible, on this coast, to deprive 
an enemy enjoying naval superiority of harbors, or prevent his using 
t~em as stations during war, insular situations being_ s0 numerous, which 
his Tessels would render unapproachable : but it seems proper that 
such of these positions as are the sites of towns, should be secured. Du-
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rm.g the last war the English held the position of Castine for sometime, 
and left it at their pleasure. It is probable that a work costing about 
·$50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position. 
(Statement 1, table F.) 
Penobscot bay.-Vpon this bay, and upon the river of the same name, 
flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many 
bays which intersect the coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the 
greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, 
a large portion of these harbors must, for the present, be left without de-
fences, but the valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered; 
and, to afford a secure retreat for such vessels as may be unable to plaee 
themselves under the protection of the works to the east or west of the 
bay, the passage of the river must be defended. The lowest point at 
which this can be done, without great expense, is opposite Bucksport, at 
the "narrows." A project has been given in for a fort at that position, es-
timated at $150,000.-(Statement 1, table D.) 
St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and 8/ieeJls Out.-West 
of the Penobscot occur the abovementioned bays, all being deep indenta-
tions, leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of indHstry 
and enterprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans 
have been formed for their defence. $400,Q00 are assigned to the defence 
of these waters. The Sheep's Cut is an excellent harbor of refuge for 
vessels of every size.--(Stateme1t.t I, table F.) 
Kennebec river.-This river ( one of the largest in the eastern States) 
enters the sea nearly mdway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. 
Croix. It rises near the source of the Chaudiere, which is a tributary of 
the St. Lawrence, and has once served as a line of operations against 
Quebec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products, 
and the active commerce of several very flourishing towns upon its banks, 
together with the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not per-
mit its defence to be neglected. The surveys be,qan many years ago, were 
never :finished. The estimated cost of defences~ as formerly reported by 
the Engineer Department, was $300,000. Positions near the mouth will 
permit a secure defence.-(Statement 1, table D.) 
Portland harbor.-The protection of the town, of merchantmen beleng-
ing to it, and of the ships of war that mav be. stationed in this harbor, to 
watch over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter ( all of them 
important objects), may be secured, as an in.spection of the map of the har-
bor will show, by occupying Fort Preble point, House island, Hog Island 
Ledge, and Fish point. 
If the two channels to t~e west and cast of Hog island can be obstruct-
e~ at small expe~se ( to decide which some surveys are yet necessary), there 
wil~ be no necessity for a battery on the ledge; and Fish point need be oc-
eupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The 
expense, as now estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be 
$155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House island ; for Hog island 
channel, say $135,000.-(Statetnent 1, tables D, E, and F.) 
Saco, Kennebunk, ar_id York.-Small works, comparatively, will cover 
these places : $75,000 1s assumed as the aggregate cost.-(Statement 1, 
table F.) 
Portsr,wuth harbor. and navy-yard.-The only goqd roadstead or h~-
bor between Cape Elizabeth an~ Cape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within 
, ., 
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,the mouth of Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle_ sh~ps c~n ascend_ as' high as 
Fox point, seven miles above the town. !his s1tuat10n? sufficiently com-
modious for a secondary naval depot, designed to repair ves.sels .of w~r, 
.:should be maintained ; but it is to be regretted that the bay to the south of 
. Fox point was not cho~e°: as. the _site of the navy-rard,_ instead of Ferna\d's 
island. Being where 1t 1s, 1t will be necessary, m time of war, to make 
.. some particular dispositions for the protection of the navy-yard from an at-
tack from the north shore of the river. ,. 
The position of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort 
;McCleary will probably, be occupied by the defences, though the works. 
themselves should give place to such as will better fulfil the object. The 
other positions for forts or batteries are Gerrish's point, Fishing island, and 
Clark's island ; some, if not all of which, must be occupied. Surveys are 
required before the projects can be formed, or before estimates can be 
made; but there is reason for believing that the entire cost of fortifyi~g 
this harbor will not fall short of $300,000.-(Statemeht I, table D.) 
Newburyport harbor.--'rhe points forming the mouth ·of the harbor are 
-continually changing; and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, fo..r the 
defence of the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a war. There .is 
-only a shoal draught of water. It is thought $100,000 will _defend this 
· harbor adequately.-(Statement 1, table F.) 
G,louceste'r harbor.-The position of this harbor, near the extremity of 
-Cape Ann,. places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachu-
:setts bay, and imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet 
-Qeen made, but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for-
·$200,000.- (Statement I, table E.) Should there be any occasion for de-
fensive works before the proposed new works can be commenced, an ex-
penditure of $10,000, in repairs on the old fort, will be required.-(Table A.) 
· Beverly ltarbor.-This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of 
the works designed for Salem. $50,000, in addition, will secure . it.-
,(Statement I, table F.) 
Salem harbor.-The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two 
miles, and separated therefrom by a peninsula. 'rhe occupation of the 
,extremity of Winter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on o~e 
·side, and Naugus head on the other, ' will effectually secure this harbor. 
Projects have been presented for this defence estimated to cost $225,000.-
,(Statement I, tables D and F.) On a sudden emergency, old Fort Lee 
may be put in an effective state for $2,000.-(Table A.) . 
Marblehead harbor.-Beside covering, in some measure, the harbor of 
Boston, Salem and Marblehead harbors possess an important commerce. of 
t heir ow~; and also afford shelter for vessels prevented, by certain winds 
from entering Boston, or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed 
~ode of d~fending ~arblehead harbor consists in occupying, on the n'.otth 
side, the hillock which commands the present Fort Sewall ( which will be 
-superseded by the new ~ork), and. on ~pe south, the position of Jack's 
ipomt. The two works will cost $318,00tl.-(Statement 1, tables D and.'F.) 
To repair old Fort SewalJ, which inay be necessary -if the new worb 
are not soon begun, will -require $10,000,-(Table A.) 
Boston h~rbor.- We come now to the most i:rpportant harbor in ,.the 
eastern sect10n of the coast, and, considering the relation to genera~ com-
merce, and the mterests of the navy, one of ,the mo.st important Ill the 
whole Union. 
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After a .careful examination of all the necessary cond~ti~n~ o( 'such a 
problem, the board of naval officers ~nd engineers, i:r_i _their JOmt report of 
1820, gave this harbor a preference over all other pos1t10ns to the east, and 
inclusive of New York bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great north-
ern naval depot; and the Government, by the great additions and improve-
ments that have from year to year been since made to the navy-yard on the 
ChaTlestown side, have virtually sanctioned the recommendation _ of the 
board. But, independent of the navy-yard, Boston is a city of great weal!h, 
and possesses an extensive and active commerce. 
The old works defended merely the interior basin from attacks by water; 
but, as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket roads with a wind too 
scant to take them to the city, or are detained in President roads by light 
winds or an adverse tide, as the former, especially, is a very convenient 
anchorage fwhence to proceed to sea, and, above all, as N antasket roads 
affords the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it was deemed 
indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. 
The project of defence regards the existing works, with the necessary re-
pairs and modifications, as constituting a second barrier. 
Beside a permanent work, now well advanced, on George's island, it con-
templates permanent works on Nantasket head-filling up the Broad sound 
channel, so as to leave no passage in that direction for ships of war. _ 
Until the best draught for steam-vessels of war shall be well ascertained,. 
it will not be safe to say to what depth the Broad sound channel should be 
restricted ; nor, indeed, can it be positively asserted that this description of 
vessel can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can1 
however, be thus excluded; and steam-vessels passing this channel would 
still have to pass the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for 
this harbor is $1 710,000. . 
Beside the works of a permanent character, it wi11 be necessary, in the 
event of a war, to erect several temporary works on certain ·positions in the-
harbor, and on the lateral approaches to the navy-yard.-(Statement I,. 
tables A, C, E, and F.) • 
Plymouth and Provincetown harbors.-These harbors have a commerce 
of some consequence of their own ; but they are particular! y interesting in 
reference to the port of Boston. While these are undefended, an enemy's 
squadron blockading Massachusetts bay will have ports of refuge under 
his lee, which would enable him to maintain hjs blockade, even through-
out the most stormy seasons : knowing that the winds which would force-
him to seek shelter would be adverse to outward-bound, and fatal to such 
inward vessels as should venture near the cape. Were the enemy deprived 
of these harbors, he would be unable to enforce a rigorous investment, as 
he would be constrfl,ined to take an offing on every approach of foul weather. 
Our own vessels coming in from sea, and :finding an enemy interposed be-
tween them and Boston, or being turned from their course by adverse 
winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports, find to the south of 
Boston shelter equivalent to thQ e provided in the east, at Marblehead, Sa-
lem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not been fully 
surveyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects of 
defence have not een formed. The former, it is thought, may be suita~ly 
cover:cd by a ·work of_ no great cost on Gumet point; while, to fortify 
Provincetown harbor m such a way as to cover vessels takino- shelter 
th rein, an at the amc time to deprive an enemy of safe anchorto-es will 
, b , 
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involve considerable expense. Pro.brtbly no neflrer \stimaty can be formed 
,at present.than that offered by the ~1~giq.,eer_ Departn1;eht _ s~m~ years a~o, 
which gave $100,000 for Plymouth, and . $,(>_00,000 for Provmcetown,-:-
(Statement I, tables D an,d E.) _ . : 
'rhe coast between Cape Cod and Cape H~tteras differs from the north-
eastern section, in" possessil)g fewer harbors, in having but little rocky, and 
a great portion of sandy shore, in its milde~ cli?J,~te and 'clearer atm~:. 
sphere · and it differs from all the other port10ns m"'the depth and magni-
tude ol its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to which deep-tide 
navigation extends up its numerous large rivers. The circuit of the coast, 
not inclirdi~g the shores of the great bays~ measures 659 miles; while a 
-straigh~ line from one of the abovenamed capes to the other, measures 
about. 520 miles. 
Martha's Vineyard Sound.-To t~e south of Cap~ Cod lie the.islands o,f 
_ Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on 
the south, and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose the 
abovenamed sound. The channels through this sound being sufficient for 
merchant vessels, 9-nd one of the channels permitting the passage even of 
·small frigates, are not only the constant tract of coasting vessels, but also 
-of large numbers of vessels arriving in · the tempestuous months from 
foreign voyages. There 'are, within the sound, the Iiarbor·s of Tarpaulin 
cove, Holmes's Hole, Edgartown, Fal.rnouth, Hyannis, and Nantucket, be-
.side smaller anchorages. 
In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, a 
portion, containing very valuable cargoes, and of which forty or fifty may 
sometimes be seen in the harbors, awaiting a change of wind, there is sup-
posed to be at least 40,000 tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of 
this sound. 
· If the harbors just named are to be defen~ed at all, it must be by fortifi-
cations. There is . little or no population, except in the towns, and even 
·th~s is beli~ved !ob~ entirely without _military organization. A privateer 
might run mto either of these harbors and capture, destroy, or levy contri-
butions at pleasure. The use of the sound itself, as ~n anchorage for ves-
sels of war, cannot be prevented by fortifications alone. $250,0P0 may 
perhaps: suffice for the defence of all the harbors against the kind of en~ 
1erprise to which they are exposed.-(Statement 1, table r.) 
New Bedford and Fairhaven liarbor.-No. survey has been made of this 
'harbor, on which lie two of.the most flourishing towns. It is easily- de-
fensible; and the amount formerly assumed by the Engineer Department 
will probably suffice, namely $30U,000:-(Statement 1, table D.) 
Buzzard's ba1j.-lnterposed between the main and the island of Martha's 
Vineyard, are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the 
.south. This bay covers the harbor of New Bedf@rd, and might be used as 
8:n an?horage by an enemy's fleet ; bat it is too wide to 9e defended _by for-
11ficat1ons. · 
Narraganset bay.-There ure three entrances into Nar:raganset roads: 
1st. The eastern cl].annel, whiqh P?-sses up ~n the east side of the island 
of Rhode Island. This being shut up by a solid bridge, needs no 4efonce, 
by fortifications, other thail} a field-'worli or two, which may be thrown up 
at the opening of a war. , · . ' 
2d. The central channel, which enters from sea by passing between 
Rhode Island and Canonicu t island. This is J:>y far t11e best entrance, and 
2 
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leads to the best anchorage; and is to be defended by a fort on the east 
side of the entrance, designed to be the principal work in the system. This 
work, called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On · the west side of the 
entrance it is proposed to place another work ; and, on an island, called 
Rose island, facincr the entrance, a third work. It is also proposed to re-
pair the old fort o~ Goat island, just within the mouth ; and also old Fort 
Green, which is a little higher up, and on the island of Rhode Island. 
3d. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves: , 1st. By 
reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as while the passage 
shall be as free as it is now for the coasting trade, it ,shall be shut as to the 
vessels of war, including steam-vessels. 2d. By relying on fortifications 
alone to close the channel ; or, 3d. By resorting in part to one and in part 
to the other mode just mentioned. Either is practicable ; but being the 
'least expensive and most certain, the estimates are founded on the first. 
The total cost of the Narraganset defences, is e~timated at $1,714,000. 
(Statement 1, tables A, C, D, E, and F.) · · 
Gardiner's 'bay.-lt is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a 
very valuable one to an enemy investing this .part of the coast, is defen~i-
ble by fortifications alone. After it s_hall have been surveyed, it may ap-
pear that from one.,, or more positions the whole anchorage may be con-
trolled by heavy s .a-mortars. In such a case, the defensive works would 
not be costly. If ,.t be found expedient to fortify soµie particular portion 
of the bay, as an anchorage for steam-batteries (which, ,however, is not an-
ticipated), the expense would probably be as great as wa:s anticipated some 
years since by the Engineer Department, viz., $400,000.-(Statement 1,. 
table F.) 
-Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.-Neither of these 
harbors have been surveyed with reference to defence. 'I1he first is pos-
sessed of considerable tonnage ; and the second, beside being engaged in 
commerce, is the terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be 
assigned to the first, and $200,000 to the other.-(Statement 1, tables E 
and F.) 
New London harbor is very impo:i:tant to the commerce of Lo,ng Island 
sound; and, as a port of easy access, havbg- great depth of water, rarely 
freezing, and being easily defended, it is a1i'""excellent station for the navy. 
It is also valuable as a shelter for ·vessels bound out or home, and desirous 
of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. 
In the plan of ~efence, the present forts (Trumbull and Griswold) give 
place to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $401,000. 
(Statement 1, tables C and F.) 
Mouth of Connecticut river.- Tbis river has been shown to be subject 
to the expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to 
its defences. $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.-(State-
ment 1, table F.) 
New Haven harbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving 
and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt 
erected during the last war called Fort Wooster. The expense of both 
may be set down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of 
old Fort Hale.-(Statement 1, tables A and F.) 
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both 
sides of the soun . 01;1e of ~em are very large as yet ; still most, if_not 
~ll, are pro perous and mcreasmg. Although, in their present condition, 
it might not be deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent de-
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fences, yet, as part of the present o?je?t is to ascert~in, as near as may be, 
the ultimate cost of completely fortifymg the c_oast, 1t seems proper to look 
forward to the time when some of these towns may become objects of pred~ 
atory enterprises of s~me magnitu~e. Bearing ~n D?ind the probable in-
crease of population lJl the meantime,_ and the s1tuat10n of. the places gen-
erally, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to provide defences (or 
all.-(Statement 1, table F.) 
New York harbor.-The objects of the projected-works for the security 
of New York are, to cover the city from an attack by land or sea ; to pro-
tect its numerous shipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of 
this great port ; and to cover the interior communication uniting this har-
bor with the Delaware. In the present condition of the defences, an ene-
my would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack were made by 
land or water. · ' j 
There · are two avenues to the city, namely : one by the main channel, 
direct from sea, and one by the sound. If an enemy come by the way of 
the sound, he may now land his forces on the New York side, at Hell-gate, 
within less than ten miles of New York, and the next day, at the latest, b~ 
in the city; or, he may land on the Long Island side, at the same distance, 
and in the same time be master of the navy-yard and of Brooklyn heights, 
whence the city of New York is perfectly commanded; or, he may divide 
Ii.is forces, and reach both objects at the same moment. 
The projected system of defence closes this avenue at. the greatest dis-
tance possible from the city, namely, at Throg's point. The occupation 
of this point will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles, from the 
~ity on one side, and still farther from the navy-yard on the other. · . 
A work now in progress at Throg's point will probably prevent any ·at-
tempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to 
land at a considerable distance from the object ; and as he will then be 
unable to turn the ~trong position afforded l.ry Harlem river, the cover on 
the New York side will be sufficient. 
· But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving par-
ties on suitable positions, with a view to prevent our crossing the river and 
falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy-yard, having no obstacle in 
his front. To prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, 
a work should he erected on WiP~ins's point, opposite Throg's point. This 
work, beside completing the defence of the channel, wou,ld involve a march 
against the navy-yard from this quarter in gre~t danger; since all the forces 
that could be collected on the New York shore might, under cover of this 
work, be crossed over to Long Island, and fall on the rear cu tl1e enemy 
cutting- off his communication with the fleet. The two works on Throo-'; 
and Wilkins's points may, therefore, be regarded as perfectly protecting, ~u 
that side, the city and navy-yard. -
Against an attack by the main channel, there are-
lst. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an en-
emy's squadron only after its arrival before the place. They consitt of 
Fort Columbus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island, 
Fort Wood, on Bedlow's island, and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island. 
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the 
lower barrier being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a disad-
vantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be 
going simultaneously :with the contest between these forts and the fleet. 
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They cnnnot, however, ·be dispensed with, until the outer barriers are· ~ntirely 
completed, if ' even then. 1 , , , , , ~ ,. 
2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passag~ becomes-· 
so ·contracted as . to permit good disposition to be ;made for defence. ,,On-th.e 
Long Island side of the Narrows, is Fort Lafayette, whioh is a strong ,water 
battery, standing on a reef, at some distance from the shore, and immediately, 
behind it, on the top of the bank, is a small b-1et strong work, called Fo.rt 
Hamilton. Some repairs being ~pplied to these works, this position may be 
regarded as well occupied. 
On the west side, or S taten Island side of the Narrows, are the following 
works, belonging to the State of New York, viz.: Fort Richmond, which is 
a water-battery ; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water-; 
Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; ar1d Port 
Tomkins, which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal woik: 
All these need great repairs ; but, being once in proper order, would afford lJ/ 
very important contribution to the defence of the passage ; nothing further, 
indeed, being contemplated for this position, except the construction of -a 
small 'redoubt on a commanding hill, a little to the southwest. The repairs . 
of these works cannot too soon be taken in hand ; and it is hoped -son:ie 
arrangement may soon be made with_ the State authorities to that ernt 
With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect 
order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against an attack 
by water through this passage. 1 
But there lies below the ]~farrows a capacious bay, affording good anchor~e 
for any number of vessels of war and transports. An enemy's squadron bemg 
in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this out-
let of the · harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of• the 
year. And it would also intercept the water communication, by the way of 
the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia. _ 1 
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend Bay 
(the place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle-of Long 
Island, in the Revolutionary war), within seven miles of the city, of Brook,. 
Jyn, of it~ commanding height, and of the navy-yard with no intervening 
obstacle of any sort. 
This danger is imminent, ancl it would not fail, in the event of a war,, to 
be as fully realized as it was during the last war; when, on the rumor of an 
expedition being in preparation in Englaad, twenty-seven thousand militia 
were assembled to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent 
that the defences near the city, and those at the Narrows, indispensable as 
they are for other purposes, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise; which 
can be thoroughly g uarded against only by 
3d. An outer ban-ier, at the very mouth of the harbor. This would ac-
complish h_vo objects of &'r~at consequence; namely, rendering a close block-
ade_ 1mposs1ble; and obl1gmg an enemy, who should design to move troops 
~runs~ the navy-yard, to land at a distance of more than twenty miles from 
his obJ ct, upon a dangerous beach ; leaving, during the absence of the 
troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter. 
~he hazards of such a land expeuition would, moreover be greatly enhanced 
by the fact that our own troops, by passing over to Lon~ Island under cover 
of the f~rt t Wil~in's oint, ·oul<l cut off the return ~f the ~nemy to h is 
t, :vlu :h m t h n or ~omcwhcre near Rockaway; time, distance, and 
cl1rcct1on of the re pect1ve marches, would make, very naturally, such a 
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manreuvre a part of the plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in 
Gravesend' Bay", no such manreuvre~ could ~e e~ect?,al, on _account of ,the 
shortness of his line of march; as well as of ~ts d1rect10n. . . 
,, In view of these considerations,the 1board of engineers projected-additional 
works -one for the east bank, and another for the middle ground; these 
'Positidns, being on shoals on either hand of the bar, outside o[ Sandy Hook. 
,Before determining ori the works last mentioned, the board went ,ipto much 
research in order to ascertain whether the shoals were unchangeable; and it was 
''thought to have been fully proved that there had been .no material alte_ration 
'in more than sixy years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged 
the board to devise the project referred to. . , . 
.. ·Recent surveys have, however, discovered a new, or rather another channel. 
If it be indeed a ne?,D channel, it shows a want of stability in the shoals, . that 
: Jotbids ahy such structures as the contemplated batteri_es; and it may be ne-
cessary· to resort to other means. Suitable means exist, unquestionably, 
though it may not be best to decide on them until all doubt as to the fixed or 
changing nature of the channel shall be removed; especially, as it must ne-
·cessarily be some time before , the completion of mom indispensable works 
will allow the commencement of these. This may, however, be said with 
certainty, namely: that, all other means failing, works may be erect~d o·n 
Sandy Hook, which will have a g9od action upon the channel, and under 
.. cover of which, bomb-k-.etches or steam-batteries, or , both, may lie. With 
such an arrangement, there would be little probability of the lower bay being 
occupied as a blockading- station. . . 
To recapitulate :-The security of the city of New York and the navy-
yard requires-first, defences on the passage from the sound, namely: the 
completion of Fort Schuyler, on Throg's point, and the erection of a fort 
on Wilkins's point-cost of both $866,000; second, the repa'ir ' of works 
on Governor's island, on. Bedlow's island, and on Ellis's island-estimated 
cost $155,000; third, the repair of the works at the Narrows, including the 
works belonging to the State-cost $450,000; and fourth, the erection of 
outer defences on or near Sandy Hook-estimated by the board of engineers 
to cost $3,362,824. ·-
The total cost, exclusive of these last, will therefore be $1,471,000; or, in-
cluding these, $4,833,824.-(Statement 1, tables A, O, and F.) 
Delawar~ bay, Fort Delaware, Fort Mijflin, Delaware breakwater.-The 
coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, a~ well as that on 
the south side of Long island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated ·by several 
inlets; but not one, beside the- D_elg.ware, is navigable by sea-going vessels. 
The Delaware bay itself being wide, and full of shoals, having an intricate 
cbannel , and being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords :no very 
good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea. 
The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen 
will, it is hoped, fully supply this need ; in which event, it must be securely 
fortified. No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object; and 
as to the probable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the 
conjectural estimate made some years sine~ in the Engineer Department, 
namely, $600,000.-(Statement 1, table F.) , , 
The lowest point at which the bay 1s defensible is at. Pea-patch island, 
about forty~five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on th~tisl~nd, 
to replace the one destl'oyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea-patcli,.on the 
Delaware shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware chal)nel. anp at the 
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same time protect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal; a tem-
porary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of.a 
war, to assist in closing the channel on that side ; together with floating ob-
structions, to be put down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all 
above this position-including Philadelphia and its navy-yard, Wilmington, 
New Castle, the canal before mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore 
railroad. 
The commencement of the rebuilding of Fort Delaware being delayed 
by difficulties attending the settlement of new claims to the island on w,hich 
it is to stand, Fort Mifflin, which is an old work, about seven miles below 
the city of Philadelphia, has been put in good order. This work is ready to 
receive its armament and its garrison. 
The expense of the work on Fort Delaware may be estimated at $491,000,. 
and of the fort opposite, $521,000.-(Statement 1, tables O and F.) 
Chesapeake bay.-The board of naval officers and engineers 1ntrusted with 
the selection of sites for a great northern and a great southern naval depot, 
recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, 'Burwell's bay, on 
James river, for the one; and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the other. 
They also recommended Boston harbor and N arraganset bay, at the north, and 
Hampton roads, at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports 
the commissioners entered at large into the consideration of all the matters 
rel~ting to these important objects, and reference is now made to those reports 
for many interesting- details. · 
Hampton roads, "James river, Noifolk, and the nam;-yard.-The works 
projected for the defence of these are, 1st, a fort at Old Point Comfort-this 
is called Fort Monroe; 2d, a casemated battery; called Fort Calhoun, on the 
Rip Rap shoals, opposite Old Point Comfort ; and 3d, a line of floating ob-
structions extending acrnss the channel from one of these works to the other. 
It was the opinion of the commissioners above mentioned, that, in the event 
of a great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be prop-
er to provide additional strength, by placing works on the positions of New-
port news, W assaw shoals, aud Craney island flats. Such an expansion has, 
however, since then, been given to the present navy-yard at Gosport (oppo-
site Norfolk), that there is little probability of any other position on these 
waters being occupied for such purposes. 
The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of 
covering the navy-yard, is conceded on all hands. 'I1he bearing of this har-
bor upon the general defence of the Chesapeake bay is, perhaps, equally well 
understood; it being very evident that a small hostile force would reluctantly 
venture up the bay, or into York river, or the Rappahannock, or any of the 
upper har9ors, leaving behind them a great naval station, and th,e common 
rendezvous of the southern coast- a station seldom, in time of war, without 
the presence of a number of vessels just ready for, or just returned from sea. 
Altho~g~ there is m~ch important work to be done to complete Fort 
Monroe, 1t 1s even now_ m a state to cont~ibute large) y to the defence of the 
roadstead; and there 1s nJ doubt that m a very short time all the case-
mated parts may be perfectly ready to receive the armament. 
rhis work will _be found in statement 1, table c, $138,367 being re-
quired to complete 1t. 
Fort . alhoun cann_ot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the 
foundation. The artifi 1al mass on which it is to stand having been rais~ 
out ot the water, the walls of the battery were begun some years since, but 1t 
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-was soon found that their weight caused consi~er~ble sµbsidence. 0~ an 
inspection by engineer officers, it was t~en dec1ded to ~eep the fou~da!10ns 
·loaded with more than the whole weight of the fimshed work, until all 
:su.bsidence has ceased. The ,load had hardly_ be~n put on, however, be-
:foi:e it was injudiciously determined to take it off and · begin to build, 
·although the settling was still going on. H~ppily, a better policy prevailed 
before t.he construction w,as resumed, qut not before the very considerable 
expense of removing the load had been infurred, and the further e~pense 
,of replacing it rendered ne,cessary . ..,-(Statem~n,t I, table C.) Reqmred to 
complete the work, $356,000. · 
-It may be expedient, in ·time of war, bY. way of providing ·iµteri9r bar-
riers, to erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, 
·and to put in condition and arm old Fort No-rfolk, :which is just below the 
,city. ' L 
Harbor of St. Mary.;_ The centrnl situation ( as regards the Chesapeake) 
,of this fine basin, its relation to .the Potomac, its depth of water, and the 
facility with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of 
refuge for the commerce., of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if 
not constant, station _during war of a portion of the,naval force. A survey 
has been made, but no project has been forme,d. The Engineer Depart-
.. ment, some years agQ, conjectured that the cost of defences in this harbor 
might amoun,t to -$300,000.-(Statement 1, table :f.) · , · 
Annapolis h:arbor.-c-No surveys or plans of defence have been made. 
·The existing works are inefficient and quite out of repair. A former esti-
·mate made by the Engineer Department, amounting to $250,Q00, is adopted 
·here.-(Statement 1, table F.) . · , · 
Harbor of Baltimore.~ The proximity of t11is city to Chesapeake hay 
greatly endangers the city,. of Baltimore. In the pre.sent state of things, an 
enemy, in a few hours' ma:i:ch, after an easy landing, and wi_thou,t having 
;his communication with his fleet seriously endangered, can .make himself 
master of that great emporium of commerce. There are' require_d for its 
·security two forts on the Patapsco, one at Hawkins's point, and the other 
\Qpposite that point, . at the extreme end of the flat that runs off from Sollers's 
point, these being the lowes~ positions at which the passage of the Patap~co 
can be well defended. Beside the advantages that will , result, qf 9,bligmg 
the enemy to land at a greater distance, thereby gaining time, by delayfr1g 
.his march, for the arrival of succor, and preventing his tu,rning the defen-
~ive positions which our troops might oc,cupy, it will be impossible, for him 
to endanger the city by a direct attack by water. 
The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery, 
·should be ratained as a second barrier. The firstmentioned is now in 
good condition, and the repairs required for the others. may be applied at 
the beginning of a war. , 
The fort on Sollers's point flats, which should be :first commenced, 'is esti-
mated to cost $1,000,O00.-(Statement I, table D.) 
The fort on· Hawkins's point (to be found in statement 1, table F) will 
·cost, it is supposed, $376,000. ' 
Mouth of Elk river.-The completion of the line of water communica-
tion from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake-makes it pl'Oper to 
place a fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an 
enemy from destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forI?ing this 
-outlet of the canal. There have been no surveys made with a view to es-
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tablish such protection, which is estimated at $50,000.-(Statement· l,, 
table F.) · . . ,. 
Cities· of Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria.-F?rt Washmg--
ton covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy-
to land at some eight or ten miles' below Alexandria, sho11l~ that city be 
,his object, and about twice as far b~low W ashingt~n. It will_ a~s~ se~ve 
the very important purpose of covermg troops crossmg from Vug1ma with 
a Yiew to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the capital from 
the Patuxent or the Chesapeake. To put the necessary repairs on Fort 
Washington will cost about $30,000.-(See statement 1, table A.) 
Cedar point, Potomac river.-But all these objects would have been 
b~tter fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar point. As it .is,. 
however, the contemplated works 1eing constructed in the Patuxent,_ and 
the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an en-
. terprise against Washington would b~ a hazardous 01').e. 
_ As gjving complete security to the towns in the District, covering more-
than sixty miles in length of the Potomac and the Patuxent, the work on 
'Cedar point should not be omitted. There have been no surveys made of 
·-~he ground, nor projects of the fort, which, in a conjectural estimate of the, 
Engineer Department, was set down at $300,000. (Statement 1, table E.) 
Patuxent river.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington 
{rom a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the Pa-
~tuxent, and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort 
has been planned to occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy J:hom-
as's point, both a short distance up the river. The ··work on, Thomas's_ point: 
is. (in statement 1, table D) estimated at $250,000; and the work on Point 
Patience (in statement 1, table F) estimated to cost $246,000. . 
Ocracock Inlet, N. O.-The shallowness of the water on the bars at this 
inlet effectually excludes all vessels of war-at least, all moved by sails. 
But as this is an outlet of an extensive commerce, and as through this open-
ing attempts might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of 
steam-vessels, to destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior 
water communication, timely preparation must be made of temporary .works 
equal to defence against all such minor enterprises. 
Beaufort harbor, N. C.-A work called Fort Macon has been erected for 
the defence of this harbor, which will require some repairs. Some opera-
tions are also cnlled for to protect the site from the wearing action of the sea. 
(Statement 1, table A.) Estimate, $10,000. . 
Mouths of Cape Fear river, N C.-The defence of the main channel 
of Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell (now nearly completed\ 
on Oak island, another fort, to be situated on Bald Head. And the defence 
of the smaller channel will require a redoubt on Federal point. The bat-
tery, magazine, block-house, &c., at Smithville, should remain as accesso-
ri s. F01~t Caswell, Oak island (statement 1, table C), requires $6,000 _to 
compl te 1t; the fort on Bald Head (statement 1, table F) will reqmre 
1 , 00; the redoubt on Federal point (statement 1, table F) wil1 require 
1 ,0 0; and the battei:;y, &c., called Fort Johnston, at Smithville (state-
ment 1 ta le A), 5,000. 
Georgetow'!1' ha7:bor, . C.-_ The first inlet of any consequence south of 
Cape . ar nver !s at. the umte<l mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and 
Black n rs, 1i rmmg orgetown harbor; which is a commodious and ca-
ciou bay, ving suffi ient water within, and also upon the bar near the 
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mouth, for .merchant vessels and small vessels of war. A survey of .~h,h:r 
harbor was begun many years ago, but never complete~; and no projects 
for defence have been made. It is probable that a work placed near Mos-
cheto creek, or on Winyaw point, ·wou]d give adequate strength at the cost 
of about $250,000. (S laternent 1, table E.) . , 
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Georgetown, 
·are the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not 
known whether the burs at the mouths of this river have sufficient water for 
sea-going· vessels. The · same un~ertainty exists_ as to the ,depth into Bull's 
,bay. It may be sufficient to cons~der these, and the other mlets betwe~n 
Georgetown and Charle;:;ton, as calling· for small works, capable of resisting 
boat enterprises, and to assign as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to 
be ·navigable for privateers, they will require a larger expenditure. (State-
ment I, table F.) · 
Charleston, S. C.-This city, situated at the junction of Ashley and 
Cooper rLvers, is about five miles, in a direct liny, from the sea. Between it 
and the ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels -of any draught. 
Upon the bar, lying three or four miles ou(side of the , harbor, there is, how-
- ever, only \\;at.er enough for smaller frigates and sloops of war. On the 
southwest side of the, hg.rbor is James's island, in which are several serpen-
tine passages, more or less navigable for boats, barges, and small steam-ves-
sels : some of them communicate directly with the sea and Stono river .. 
Whappoo cut, the most northerly I?assage from the Stono· to Charleston har-
bor, enters Ashley river opposite the middle of the city. 
Interior natural water communicatio9-s exist, also, to_ the southwest of 
Stono river, connecting this with North Edis_to river; the latter with South 
Edisto and St. Helena's sound; this, again, with Broad river; and, finally,, 
,this last with Savannah river. . 
On the north side of the harbor of Char'. eston lies Sullivan's island, sepa-
rated from the main by a channel navigable 0n]y by small craft. On the 
northwest side of this island is au interior water communication, which ex--
tends to Bull's bay, and even bey01~d, to the harbor of Georgetown. 
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences, 
to the principal entrance of the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be-
shut. And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show 
· that the best method of defending them will be by works at or near the· 
mouths of the inlet, as the enemy w,ill be keJ?t thereby at a gteater distance· 
from the city ; the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be protect-
ed ; and the line of interior water communication will be inaccessible from 
the sea. 
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor. 
can be found :qearer to the ocean than th~ westem extremity of .Sullivan's-
island. This is at present occµpied by Fort Moultrie-a work of sonic 
strength, but by no means ~adequate to its o~ject; its battery being weak, 
and the scarp so low as to , oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far 
this work, by a modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute 
to a foll defence of the harbor, has not yet be~n determined. But so long 
as it is the only work at this, the principal point of defence,- it must.be kept. 
in good condition for service ; and no alterations that will disturb this effi-
ciency should be undertaken. It is now ready to receive its guns. 
On a shoal, nearly opposite to Fort Moultrie, the foundation of a fort 
has been begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie •. 
' 
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'This is called Fort Sumter. (Statement 1, table C.) To complete this work 
wjll require, it is estimated, $201,000. 
IQ. the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter's Folly 
island. This work is now ready to receive its guns. 
Stono, North Edisto, and South Edisto.-All these must be fortified, at 
,, least in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or 
.smal] vessels. To that end, $50,000 may be assigned to e'ach.-(Statement 
1, table F.) - , 
St. Helena sound.-The proper defences cannot be pointed out till the 
sound shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no great 
depth of water on the bar, it is known t0 be navigable for the smaller class 
of merchantmen, and for steamboats, and to have a navigable communication 
with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal, intersecting the interior,nayiga-
tion between Charleston. and Savannah. The estimate is $150,000.-(State-
ment 1, table F.) 
Broad river, or Port Royal roads.-The value of this capacious road-
stead, as a harbor of refuge, depends on the depth that can be carried over 
the bar; on the distance of this bar beyond the ]ine of coa~t; and on the 
means that may be applicable of lessening the danger of croi'lsing it. This 
is supposed to be the deepest bar on the southern coast. Should there prove 
to be water enough for frigates, and should it be practicable to make th,e pas-
sage over the bar safe and easy, by the erection of light-h9uses on the shore, 
and lights, or other distinct guides, on the bar, this harbor, situated within 60 
miles of the city of Charleston, and 20 of Savannah river, intersecting the 
interior water-communication between these cities, thereby securing the ar-
rival of supplies of every kind, would possess a high degree of importance, 
not only as a harbor of refuge, but also as a naval station. 
The survey of the exte'rior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made 
with the greatest care and all possible minuteness. Only when this shall 
have been done, can the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast be 
known; and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required de-
fences will depend. For the preseat, the estitnate made so,me years ago by 
the engtneer department is adopted, namely, $300,000.-(Statement 1, ta-
ble E.) 
Savannah, and mouth of Savannah river, Georgia.-Mention has been 
made of the natural interior water-communication along the coast of South 
Carolina. A similar communication extends, south-from the Savannah river, 
as far as the St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of 
Savannah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than 
the harbor or river; and, accordingly, its defences must have relation to these 
lesser, as well as greater channels. 
The distance from the mouth of W as$aw sound, or even Ossabaw sound 
{both to the southward of Savannah river), to the city, is not much greater 
t~an from the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may proceed the whole 
~tstance by water, or part of the way by water, and part by ]and, from either 
mlet, or from both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of 
Charleston, it cannot now be detennined where they can be defended most 
advantageously. It is hop<'d, however, that the localities will permit the 
def nces to be placed near th_e inlets, because, thus placed, they wjll serve 
the do 1bl ~mrp_ se _of g mrdmg th city of Savannah and covering these 
harh r , wh1 h m time of war_, cai:not but be very useful. . 
The d fence of avannah nver 1s not difficult. A fort on Cock pur isl-
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and, lying just within the ~outh, and, verhaps, for additional security, 
another on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of 
the river, would prevent the passage pf vessels . up the channel, and cover 
the anchorage between Tybee and Cockspur. _ . 
Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be 
maintained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the 
passages which come into the river from the south ; which last would not 
be at all controlleq by works on Cockspur or 'I1ybee. Fort Pulaski, on 
Cockspur island, is well advanced, and, to a certain extent, is even now effi-
cient. $156,000 are required to complete the works, and the outworks. and 
appendages. (Statement 1, table C.) To fortify Tybee island may require 
$120,000. (Statement 1, table E.) And to repair Fort Jackson, $50,000. 
(Statement 1, table A.) . 
Wassaib sound; Ossabaw sound; St. Catharine's sound, at the mouth 
of Medway river ; Sapelo sound J Doby inlet ; Altalffl,aha sound, at the 
mouth of Altamaha river; St. Simon's sound, at the nwuth ef Bujf"alo 
creek; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths qf the Scilla and San-
tilla rivers; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river.-
All these communications with the ocean are highly important, as regards 
the line of interior navigation, and several of them as affording access to 
excellent harbors. The last, and one or two others, are known to be· navi-
gable to the largest sloops of war and,merchantmen, and so'l:ne of the others 
are but little inferior as regards depth of entrance, or ·safety of anchorage . 
. All these openings have yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably 
,easily defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of 
floating defences. 
It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole 
.southern coast, that, on a shore possessing few harbors, it is at the same time 
more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, atid more easy to de-
prive an enemy of that shelter, without which a close blockade cannot be 
maintained. This principle is enforced, in the instance of our southern coast, 
by the two following weighty considerations, namely: 1st. Its remoteness 
from the nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is, on a mean, 
600 miles distant, and to leeward both as to wind and current; and 2d. Its 
being close upon the larboard hand, as they enter the Atlantic, of the great 
concourse of vessels passing at all seasons through the Florida ,channel. 
,While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, 
is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it 
only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a su-
perior enemy. 
Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether pur-
sued by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to, shun the dangers which 
beset the navigation of these harbors, and properly ananged defences to cover 
them when arrived, seem to be indispensable. . . 
·when _these harbors shall be fortified, tp.e operation of investing the coast, 
and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage, will 
be a difficult and hazardous ~e to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or 
skill can avail to maintain a continuous blockade; while, on the part of our 
small vessels of war, steam-frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervis-
ion will be at all times easy and safe. . 
Nothing better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average 
cost of defending each of the nine ent:r:,ances-giving a total of $1,800,000. 
(Statement 1, tables E and F.) 
• 
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St. Augustine, Florida.-This, the most southern .of the harbors on the 
Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible· to the 
smaller class of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam-vessels, and requires 
;i certain amount of protection from attacks by water. _It i~, ·t~1erefore; pro-
posed to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort Manon) that comlllands 
the harbor in a serviceable state, which will require $50,000.-'-(Statemerit 1, 
table A.) · - -
Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy 
to Cape Florida, pointed out every harbor of any consequence, and specified 
every work that a thorough system of defence will require, we will, in ·?rder 
to give a comprehensive view of the number and cost of the works, refer to 
statement 1 accompanying this report. In that statement the works are di-
vided into tables, showing separately, 1st (table A), the old works already re-
paired, and those proposed to be repaired and retained in tb.e system .of de-
fence. 2d. (Table C.) Works under construction. 3d. (Table D.) Works 
to be first commenced. 4th. (Table E.) Works to be commenced next after 
those in table D. 5th.-(Table F.) Works to be last commenced. 
Seacoast from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine. 
The first positions that present themselves on doubling around Cape Flor-
ida into the Gulf of Mexico, are Key West and the l)ry Tortugas. · 
A naval force, designed to control the navigation of' the gulf, could desire 
no better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside 
of the only path through the gulf, it is, at the same time, well situated as to 
all the great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the 
mouths of the Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the gulf. ·The 
~ Tortugas harbors, in particular, are said to afford perfect shelter for vessels of 
every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress; and there can be 
no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would, with 
great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort, and his point of gen-
eral rendezvous and concentration for all op©rations on this sea. With an 
enemy thus posted, the navigation of the gulf by us would be imminently 
hazardous, if not impossible; and nothing but absolute naval superiority would 
avail anything against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer 
than the near st shore of the continent. 
It is believed that there are no harbors in the g·ulf at all comparable with 
these that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him 
of these would, therefore, be interfering materially with any organized sys-
tem of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, 
however, do much more than this. It would transfer to our own ..squadron, 
even_ should it be inferior, these most valuable positions; and it would affor~ 
a pomt of refuge to our navy and our commerce, at the very spot where 1t 
would be most nece ... sary and useful. 
By occupying two, or at most three small islands, the harbors of the Dry 
Tortugas (there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly pro-
tected. The work must be adequate to re!st escalade, bombardment, and 
ca_nnonade fr m v e , and to s~tain a protracted investment; but as th~y 
will no~ be xp. d to any or~rat10ns resembling a siege, there can be no dif-
ficulty m fulfillmg the cond1t10ns. They must have capacious store-rooms, 
. r 
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!be thoroughiy bomb,pro?f, arid oe_ q'eavily'armed. The fortification of Key 
West should be of.a similar character. , 
. ;N~, details · c~n .. be g.iven m~til all thes~ positions have been minutely sur-
veyed, with reference to ,defence. . . , ., . . 
, .. ~he, suin of .$3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the Engmeer 
Pepartment as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas, and for Key , 
West; and this 'estimate may now be taken as a:mple. (Statement 2, table F.) 
Turning now to tµe shore of the gulf, we find ~ porti?n, na1:nely, from 
Cape Florida to Pensacola, that has never been e,xam.med with particular refer-
.ence to the · defence of the harbors. Within this space there are Charlotte · 
J,,'~;;bor, Espiritu Santo bay, .Apa_laclticola bay, Appalaclte bay; St. Joseph's 
,bµy, and Santa Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assum~ 
f9r the~e ,the estim~te formerly presented by !he Engineer Departtnent, yiz·: 
.$1,000,000 for all.-(Statement 2, table F.) . . . . -. 
We now pass on to the remaining p~i_n1s, ?f defe?ce on the gi1lf. . _ 
Pensac_ola bay.~ The \lpper arms of this considerable bay receive the 
Yellow-water or Pea· river,· Middle river, and Escambia river. , ,·.rhe tributa-
ries of the last, intedocking with the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, seem 
(,o mark the' routes w:hereby, at some-future day.., canals will convey a part of 
th,.e produ.cts of th~se rivers to Pensacol,a; while the qualities and _position of 
the harbor, and the favorable nature of the country, liave already marked out 
lip.es of railroad co,mmunication with a vast interim'. region. . 
, Santa Rosa sound extends ea_stward from _the lower part ~f Pensacola bay, 
into Santa Rosa bay. On, the .west the lagoons · of Pensacola, Perdjdo, and 
Mobile bays, respectively, interlock in such a man!ler as to require but a few 
miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel frc:>m the :fast to the last 
.,named ~ay, and th~nce, through an existing interior water communication, 
:to the city of New Orleans. . · . 
_ J?,~n$acola bay has rare propertjes as a . harbor. It is now accessible to 
frigates, and there is reason to hope tha_t the bar may be ·,permanent! y de~p-
,ened. The harbor is near -the coast, and the cq.anw~l aoross it straight arid 
-easily hit. The ha1bor is perfectly land-lol~ked, and the. roadstead. very c~_pa-· 
::dous. ,. There are excellent po$itions· within,' for repairing, building; and 
l~unching vessels, and for docks aI).d dock-:yards, iii healthy situations. The 
~µppcy of good water is abundant. The· hG',rbor is perfectly defensible. TJ;iese 
prqperties, in connexion with 'the position of the harbor-, as regards the coast, 
have induced the Government to select it as a nav~l station and ·place of ren-
. · dezvous and repair. , , ~ . 
The defences of the water_ passag~, as projecte~, are nearly complete. A 
-work is just begun at the position of ~he Ba~ral)cas., It is indispe11sable, in 
,connexion witn one or two other small worfrn, designed to cover the riav._y-
yard from a lateral attack through the we~tern bays: The Ban-ancas work 
may require} $1 oo,oqo, ,and the otµers $20Q·,900, ~aking 'a total for ~en~a-
cola of $300,000.~(Statement.2, table~ A an~. F.) . - · 
.Per.dido bay.-,.I'his bay is intima,tely. re,lc!t.tep. to · 'Pensacola an_d )\fobile,,. 
bays, both as regards security and intercommu~ication, . and should be' care-
fully surveyed with a view (o these obj~cts. It must be fortified, and the·cost 
inay be $200,000.-(Statement 2, table F~) ' . . .. 
M(}bile hay.-The plan of defence fo~ this bay compl;ises a fort, µ.ow need-
~ng some repairs, for Mobile point. Another fort is · p~ojected for Da~phin 
island, and a tower for the defence of, Pass-au-If,eron. The estimates for ·all 
,:equire $905,000.-(Statement 2, tables E and F.) 
- [ 2] 30 
New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi.-The most. northern water 
communication between the Mississippi and the gulf, is by the passage called 
the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is 
the pass of Chef Menteur, also ~onnecting these lakes. Through these pas-
sages, an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain, would, at the same time that 
he intercepted all water communicafon with Mobile and Pensacola, be able 
t<t reach New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake; or he might con-
tinue onward through lake MaurepasJ Amite river, and Iberville river, there-
by reachino- the Mississippi at the very head of the delta; or, l~nding within 
the mouth~ of the Chef Menteur, he might move against the city along the 
ridge of the Gentilly road. To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the 
head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou Bienvenrue, a navigable channel (the one 
followed by the English army in the last war), not running quite to the 
Mississippi, but bounded by shores of such a nature as to enable troops to 
march from the point of debarkation to the city. · 
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike at the Rigolets; by Fort Wood 
at Chef Menteur; hy a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue; and by a tower at 
Bayou Dupre. · 
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about 
seventy miles below New.., Orleans-the lowest position that can be occupied. 
Fort Jackson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip a little lower down on 
the left. · 
All these forts have Men abandoned for several years; and, until quite re-
cently, having receiwed no attention in the way_ of timely repairs, now re-
quire repairs somewhat extensive-especially Forts Jackson and St. Philip on 
the Mississippi. Fifty thousand dollars will be required to place all these 
works in order. (Statement 2, table A.) 
The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the 
sea, passes on the west side of the island of Grande Terre into Barrataria bay, 
which is an excellent harbor for a float.mg force, guarding the coast trade on 
that side of the Mississippi . . Prom this bay there are several passages leading 
to New Orleans: '11he estimates for a work which is p.ow about to be begun 
on Grande Terre island, is $280,000. (Statement 2, ·table 0.) 
Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would 
demand the employment of floati~g defences, in addition to fixed defences 
upon the shore. Vv e have here an instance in which that kind of defence 
would be ve1y. useful. Fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans 
even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but, owing 
to the great width of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, by fortification 
alone, deprive an enemy of anchorages ( especially that of Ohandeleur island), 
nor cover entirely the exterior water communication between the Rigolets and 
Mobile. We must, therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance an.d in-
jury that an enemy in possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them 
by a timely preparation of a .floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation,-
and capable, under die shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and 
of assuming an offens·ve or defensive attitude, accordino- to the designs, con-
du.ct, or situation of the enemy. 0 
The examination of the coast, from Cape Florida to the Sabine, having 
now been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for 
a comprehensive view of the number and cost of the works to statement 2, 
wherein th.! works are divided into tables similar to those of 'statement 1. 
T e works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be 
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postponed to a late day. Bllt among them have been placed some (as, for 
example, those for Tortug~s and Key_ West), as to which the examinati?n 
has not been sufficiently mmute to decide to what clas~ they really appertam. 
Western frontier> from tlte Sabine bay to Lake Superior. 
The principles which should govern in _fortifyi°:g the _seaboard, are not 
considered applicable to our _inland frontiers, which will very rarely be 
found to call for regular forti'fications. Hence, in relation to that portion 
of the frontier now under consideration, nothing more will be done than 
t,o indicate the military positions or stations which it is believed should be 
occupied by troops, in order to accomplish the object~ in view, and in 
presenting estimates of the probabl~ cost of constructrng the necessary 
barrilcks, quarters, and .storehouses, combined wjth such works of defence 
as circumstances may appear to require, to ensure their protection against 
the attacks to which they may be exposed. 
The want of a personal knowledge of our extensive western frontier, 
and the very limited surveys which have been made in that quarter, have 
rendered somewhat embarrassing the· sele,ction of positions ; but it is· in-
tended · merely to designate places, in a geographi~al sense, leaving the 
particular sites on which the works should be erected, to be determined 
hereafter by minute examiqations of the country at a~d around those po-
sitions ; whieh become the more important, inasmuch as the original loca-
tions of some of the places that wm be recommended to be retained, have· 
been considered faulty. 
The southern section of this frontier: extending from the Sabine bay to, 
the Red ;river, borders ~11 the way on Texas; and has, it is believed, little 
or nothing to apprehend · from Indian aggressions. 'I1he Camanches, the 
only tribe of any po\Ver in that quarter, are repfesented as gradually rece-
ding to the westward, and the progress of the Texian settlements will tend 
to push them further from our border. But o~r reiations with tht3 Texian 
Republic, however amicable they may be at present, would seem to require 
that some military force should _be stationed on or near -the boundary-line; 
and it is, therefore, recommended to establish t,v:o small posts on the Sa-
bine river, and to suppress Fort Jesup, which· js considered too far within 
the frontier, or to retain it merely as a healthy cantonment. 
As these would be posts of observation, having reference to national po-
lice more than to military defence, they ought to be established on the 
river, where the principal roads cross it, by which we should be enabled to, 
supervise the chief intercourse with our neighbors by land, and, at · the: 
same time, control the navigation of the Sabine_. The points where the 
Opelousas and Natchitoches i:oads, leading to Texas, strike the river, are,. 
therefore, recommended as the positions which should be occupied, and at 
which barracks for two or three companies, defended by light-works, should 
be constructed. · 
The middle section, which extends from the Red river to the 'Missouri, 
is by far the most important portion of the whole of our western frontieL 
It is along this line that the numerous tribes of Indians who have emi-
grated from the east have been located; thus adding to the indigenous 
force already in that region an immense mass o(emigrants, some of whom 
have been sent thither by coercion, with smothered feelings of hostility-
rankling in their bosoms, which probably wait but for an occasion to burst 
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forth in all its savage fury. These considerati~~s alone w:ould ~eem to call 
for strong precautionary measures ; but an additional motive will be found 
in our peculiar relations with those Indians. 
We are bound by solemn treaty stipulations to interpose force, if neces-
sary, to prevent dom8stic strife among. them, pr~serve peace betwe~n the 
several tribes, and to protect them agamst any disturbances at their new 
homes by the wild Indians who inhabit the country beyond. The Govern-
ment has thus contracted the two-fold obligation of intervention among, and 
protection of, the emigrant tribes, in addition to the duty which it o~es to 
its own citizens, of providing for their safety. . . 
This obligation, it is believed, can only be properly .fulfilled by maintainJ. 
ing advanced positions in the Indian country, with an adequate restraining 
military force; and that the duty of protecting our own citizens will be best 
dischamed by establishing an interior line of posts alo_ng the western bor-
ders of the States of Arkansas and Missouri, as auxiliaries to the advanced 
positions, and to restrain the intercourse between the whites and the Iqdi-
ans, and serve as rallying points for the neighboring militia in times of 
alarm. 
With these views, it is recommended to maintain Fort 'Towson, on Red 
river, and Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas, a:p.d to establish a post at the.head 
of navigation on the Kansas, and one at Table creek, on the Missouri, be-
. low the mouth of the Big Platte, as constituting the advanced positions Qn 
this portion of the frontier. 
For the secondary line, intended for the protection of the border settle-
ments, it is recommended to adopt the positions which have been selected 
by a commission of experienced officers along the western boundary of 
Arkansas and Missouri (at some of which, it is understood, works are al-
.ready in pro~ress), namely, Fort Smith, on the Arkansas, Fort Wayne, on 
the Illinois, ~pring river, and Marais de Cygne; terminating, to tp.e north, 
at Fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri. It is also recommended to establish 
one or two intermediate posts between the ArkaIJ.sas and Red rivers, if, on 
further examinati9n of the country, suitable positions can be selected near 
• the State line. It is not deemed advisable to establish those posts on the 
route of the road lately surveyed, which ( especially the southern portion) 
is considered too far in advance of the border settlements t9 accomplish the-
object in view ; but if eligible positions cannot be found a!ong the line, 
then a post on the road, where it crosses the Potean river, which is not very 
remote from the settlements, might have a salutary influence. 
On the northern portion of this frontier, extending from the Missouri river 
to Lake Supcri_or, it _is recommended to establish a post near the upper forks 
of the Des Momes nver; to maintain Fort Snelling, on the Mississippi; and 
ultimately, to establish a post at the western extremity of Lake Superior. 
The last is suggested with some qualification, for want of the necessary in-
formation by which to determine the channel of communication to that re-
~o~e J?<)Sitio~. ~het~er i_t shall be_ thr?ugh Lake Superior, or by the Mis-
s1ss1pp1 and its tnbutanes, 1t would, m either case, be djfficult in peace, and 
next to impra~ticable i_n time of war. As the position has, however, impor-
tant geographical relations, and would enable us to extend our influence and 
contr_ol over the Indian~ witl:in our territory, and afford protection to our tz:a-
dcr~ m _ that remote region, 1t would seem worthy of early occupation, if its 
ma1 tenance can be rendered secure-a point which can only be dctem1ined 
by a careful examination of the country. 
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. It is nevertheless, recommended to retain Fort Crawford, at Prairie du 
--Chien { Fort Winnebago, at the portage of the Fox and ·wisconsin rivers; 
and Fort Howard ·at Green Bay. Tfu.ese posts are· deemed r;i.ecessary to pro-
tect that portion of our frontier, while, at the same time, they serv~ to cover 
an important line of intercommunication between the northern lakes and 
the wes~erri waters. . 
It has not been thought expedient to continue the interior line of defence 
across from the Missouri to the Mississippi river. Our Indian relations in that 
quarter assume a different aspect. There is no special guarantee of perpetual 
occupation of that country by the tribes \Vho now inhabit it; nor can it be 
doubted that they will ultimately be pushed, by the advance of our popula-
tion, to tfi.e west of the Missouri river. Under these circumstances, it is_ be-
lieved that the intermediate post recommended to be established on the Des 
Moines river, co-operating with the posts on the Missouri, and those on the 
Upper Mississippi, will afford adequate- protection to the border settlements-
against any attacks to which they are likely to be exposed. · 
It may not be atiuss to observe, that the positions which have been desig-
nated for the western frontier, will not, of themselves, have the desired influ-
ence in restraining the Indian tribes and protecting our border settlements, 
without the aid of a respectable force, of which a full proportion should be 
mounted, and held disposable at all times, for active service in the field. To 
effect this, the works should be so constructed that while they will afford ade-
quate accommodations for all the troops when they are not actively em~ 
ployed, their defence may safely be intrusted to a small force. With these 
precautionary measures, and the co-operation of small but effective reserves, 
posted within sustaining distances of the several sections of the frontier, it is 
believed that peace may be preserved, and the first onset of war met, until 
the militia of the neighboring country could be imbodied and brought into 
the field. 
It only remains to recapitulate the positions which have been recom-
mended to be occupied; apportion the requisite force, and present a con .. 
jectural' estimate of the cost of erecting the accommodations and defences 
deemed necessary at each. 
1. For quarters for 100 men at the post on· the Sabine where 
the Opelousas road crosses that river, including defences $20,000 00 
2. For quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where 
the Natchitoches road crosses, including defences 20,0001 ·oo 
3. For permanent quarters, and other accommodations, for 
500 men at Fort Towson, including defences 100,©00-00 
4. For permanent quarters, and other accommodations, for 
1,000 men at Fort Gibson, including defences - - 180,000 00 
5. For quarters for 300 men at the post on the Kansas, in-
cluding defences 60,000 -00 
6. For quarters, and other· accommodations, 'for 500 men at · 
the post at ,.fable creek, near the mouth· of the Platte,· ', 
on the Missouri, including defences - - -· , . 75,000 ·oo 
7. For quarters, and other accommodations, for 400' men at 1 • , ~ , 
the post on the Des Moines river, including defences - . , 60,000, 00 
8. For the enlargement and repair of Fort 'Snelling, 1to fit it ' · ( # 
for the accommodation of 300 men, including defences 30,000 00 
9. For quarters for 400 men at the post at the western ex-




'10. For quarters for 200 men at the post between the Red 
and Arkansas rivers, including defences - - $50,000 001 
11. For completing quarters, and other accommodations, for 
200 men at Fort Smith, including defences - - 50,000 00· 
12. For completing quarters, and other accommodations, for 
200 men at Fort Wayne, including defences - - 59,000 OO-, 
13. For quarters, and other accommodations, for 200 men at 
the post at Spring river, including defences - - 50,000 00 · 
14. For quarters, and other accommodations, for 200 men at 
the post at Marais de Cygne, including defences. . - 50,000 00· 
15. For completing quarters, and other accommodat10ns m 
progress, for 400 men at Fort Leavenworth, including 
defences 50,000 00 
Total for western frontier 895,000 00 
It is deemed proper here to observe, that great exactness or precision has. 
not been attempted in preparing the estihiates submitted in the foregoing re-
port. Hence, the amounts stated for the various objects are to be rngarded· 
only as approximations. They could not be anything more, on the data 
used, which, for want of minute surveys and reconnoissances, were neces-
sarily vague. It is believed, however, that the results presented will be found 
sufficiently accurate for the general purposes contemplated by the resolutions 
11nder which this report has been prepared. 
The time required to construct and put in order the whole system of de-
fence upon the several lines of our frontier, must depend on the amount of 
the annual appropriation. All that need now be said on the subject is, that 
in an undertaking necessarily involving so much time, and of such vital im-
portance, there should be no relaxation of -diligence. With all diligence,, 
many years must necessarily be consumed. But the work may be too much. 
hurried, as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at which 
jt will be executed in the best manner, and at the minimum cost. If more 
hurried, it will be defective in quality, and more costly if delayed. 
The maximum amount that can be beneficially expended annually upon 
the construction of fortifications, will depend upon · the strength of the corps 
<>f engineers, upon the sums annually appropriated, upon the periods of 
the sessions at which the appropriations are made, and upon the proper 
distribution of the sums appropriated among the several works under con-
.struction. 
If the necessary amounts are appropriated, at or near the commencement 
<>f each regular session of Congress, and the whole amount distributed along· 
the coast, so as not to assign too large a sum to any single work, it is believed 
that, with the present strength of the corps of engineers, the sum of four and 
A half millions of dollars, at least, may be annually expended, until the sys-
tem adopted for the defence of our frontier shall have been so far advanced, 
ae to render it proper to curtail the operations. 
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There are available for operations, six field officers of the c01ps of engi-
neers, who may each superintend operations and disbursements to the 
amount of $300,000 $1,800,000 
12 captains, each $150,000 - 1,soo,O0O 
12 first lieutenants, each $75,000 900,000 
4,500,000 
leaving 24 2d lieutenants and brevet 2d lieutenants, as assistant engineers. 
The past experience of the department justifies the belief, that, with the 
present strength of the corps of engineers, this sum may be annually ex-
pended on a system of operations conducted in a prudent and beneficial man-
ner. Upon the occurrence of any sudden emergency, however, an additional 
force might be temporarily called to the aid of the corps, and a much larger 
sum might be expended. · 
All which is respectfully submitted. 
Hon. JOHN BELL, 
Secretary ef War. 
JOS. G. TOTTEN, 
Colonel and Chief Engineer. 
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STATEMENT 1, 
Of the f orti.ftcations constructed, constructing, or repairing, and of th~s~ 
proposed to be constructed or repaired for the defence of the seacoast , 
from Passama,quoddy bay to Cape Florida. 
Designation of the works. 
A.-Old works repaired, and those proposed to be re-
paired, with the amounts required to put them in a 
serviceable condition. 
1 Fort at Gloucester, Mass. 
2 Fort Lee, Mass. 
3 Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Mass. 
4 Fort Independence, Boston, Mass. 
5 Fort Winthrop, Governor's Island, Boston, Mass. 
6 West-head battery, Governor's island, Boston, Mass. 
7 Southeast battery, Governor's island, Boston, Mass. 
8 Fort Wolcott, Newport, R. I. 
9 Fort Green, Newport, R. I. -
IO Fort Hale, New Haven, Conn. 
11 Fort Gibson, Eilis's island, N Y. 
12 Fort Wood, Bedlow's island, N. Y. -
13 Fort Richmond, Staten island, N. Y. - } 
14 Fort Tompkins, Staten island, N. Y. -
15 Battery Hudson, Staten island, N. Y. 
16 Battery Morton, Staten island, N. Y. -
17 Fort Johnston, Cape Fear river, N. C. 
18 Fort Washington, Potomac river, Md. 
19 Fort Macon, Beaufort, N. C. -
20 Fort Jackson, Savannah river, Georgia 
21 Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Florida -
C.-Works under construction. 
1 Fort Warren, George's island, Boston, Mass. -
2 Fort Adams, Newport, R. I. - -
3 Fort Trumbull, New London, Conn. 
4 Fort Schuyler, Throg's Neck, N. Y. -
5 Fort Delaware, Delaware river 
6 Fort Monroe, Old Point Comfort, Va. 
7 Fort Calhoun, Hampton roads, Va. -
B Fort Caswell, Oak ·sland, N. C. ~ 
9 Fort umter, Charleston, S. C. 






































_ST A TEMENT I-Continued. 
Designation of the .works. 
JO -!---------------------
D.-·Works to be first commenced. 
1 . Fort at Bucksport, Penoli>scot river, Me. 
2 Forf at ohe mouth of Kennebec river, Me. 
3. Fort Scammel, House island, Portland, Me. -
4 Works in Port$mouth harbor, N. H. -
5 Fort Pic,kering, Salem, Mass. 
6 Fort on Jack's point, Marblehead, Mass. 
7 Works at Provincetown, Cape Cod, J_\iass. 
8 Works at New Bedford, Mass. . 
9 Fort on Rose island, Narraganset roads, R. I. 
10 Fort on Soller's pciint flats, Md. -
11 Fort on ;I'homas's point, Patuxent river, Md. 
E.- Works to be commenced ne:ct after tltose in D. 
1 Fort Preble, Portland harbor, Me. 
2 Works at Gloucester, Mass. 
3 Closing Broad Sound pass, Boston harbor, Mass. 
4 Works at Gurnet point, Plymouth, Mass. 
5 Works at Stonington point, Conn. 
6 Fort on Cedar point, Potomac river, Md. 
7 Works at Georgetown harbor, S. C. 
8 Works in Port Royal roads, .S. C. 
s 
9 Works on Tibee island, Savannah river, Ga. -
F.-Works to be last commenced. 
1 Works in East post harbor, Me. 
. 2 Works in Machias harbor, Me. 
3 Works in Mount Desert island, Me. 
4 Works at Castine, Me. 
5 ·works at St. George's bay, Me. 
6 Works at Damariscotta bay, Me. 
7 Works at Broad bay, Me. 
8 Works at Sheepscot bay, Me. 
9 .Works on Hog island channel, Portland, Me. 
10 Works at the mouth of Saco river, Me. 
11 Works at the mouth of Kennebunk river, Me. 












































































Designation of the works. 
Works at Newburyport, Mass. 
Works at Beverly, Mass. 
Works at Naug·us Head, Mass. 
Works at Fort Sewall, Marblehead, Mass. - -
Fort and outworks at Nantasket Head, Boston, Mass.} 
Redoubt on Hog island, Boston harbor, Mass. 
Works at Tarpaulin cove, Mass. 7 
Works at Holmes's hole, Mass. J 
Works at Edgartown, Mass. - ~ 
Works at Falmouth, Mass. j 
·works at Hyannis harbor, Mass. 
Works at Nantucket harbor, Mass. 
Works at Canonicut island, R. I. 
Closing west passage of N anaganset roads, R. I. 
Fort Griswold, New London, Ct., 
·w orlrn at the mouth of Connecticut river, Ct. 
Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, Ct. 
Fort Worster, New Haven harbor, Ct. 
Works for harbors and towns between New Haven and 
New York -
Work in Gardiner's bay, Long Island sound, N. Y. -
Works in Sag harbor, N. Y. - - -
Fort on Wilkins's point, Long island, N. Y. -
Fort on Middle-ground shoal, Sandy Hook, N. Y. 
Fort on East Bank shore, Sandy Hook, N. Y. 
Fort at Delaware breakwater - -
Fort opposite Fort Delaware, Del. 
Fort on Elk river, Maryland -
Fort on Hawkins's point, Maryland -
Works at Annapolis harbor, Maryland 
Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent river, Maryland 
Works at St. Mary's, Potomac river, Maryland 
Works at Bald Head, Cape Fear river, N. C. 
Works at Federal point, Cape Fear river, N. C. 
Works at the mouth of Santee river, S. C. - } 
Work:; at Bull's bay, and other inlets, S. C. -
Works at Stone sound, S. C. 
Works at orth Edisto sound, S. C. -
Works at outh Edisto sound, S. C. -
Works at St. Helena sound, S. C. 











































.52 Works at W assaw sound, Georgia - -
,53 Works at Ossabaw sound, Georgia - -
54 Works at St. Catharine's sound, Georgia -
55 Works,at Sapelo sound, Georgia - -
56 Works at Doby inlet, Georgia - -
57 Works at Altamaha sound, Georgia - -
58 Works at St. Simon's sound, Georgia -
59 ·works at St. Andrew's sound, · Georgia -
oO Cumberland sound, mouth of St. Mary's river, Ga. 
~ 
Recapitulation. 
A. Old forts and batteries - - -
C. Fortifications under construction - -
D. Fortifications to be first commenced -
E. Fortifications to be next constructed -
F. Fortifications to be last commenced -
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT' 
Washington, July I _, 1841. 
I -
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STATEMENT 2, 
~ Of the fortifications constructed, co_nstructing, or repairing, and of /hosf:I' 
, proposed to be constructed or repaired, for the defence o/ the gulf f ron-
tier, from Cape Florida to the Sabine bay. 
,= 
0 




A.-Old works repaired, and those proposed to be re-
I 
paired,1 and the amounts required to put them in a 
serviceable condition. 
1 Fort Barrancas, Pensacola, Florida - - - $100,000·· 
2 . Fort St. Philips, Mississippi river, La. - l 3 E01t Pike, Rigolets, La. -. - -
~ . 4 · Fort ·wood, Chef Menteur, La. - - 5p,ooo-5 Battery Bienvenue, La. - - -
6 Tower at Bayou Dupre, La. - - j 7 Fort Jackson, Mississippi river, La. -- -
15p,ooo 
- C.- Works under construction. 
Fort Livingston, Barrataria island, La. - - $280,000 
E.- W9rks to be constructed after those in D, of state-
ment 1, are completed. 
1 Tower at Pass au Heron, Mobile bay, Alabama - $25,000 
F .-Works to be last commenced. 
1 Works at Key West, or Tortugas, Florida - - $3,000,000 
2 Works at Charlotte harbor, Florida - -
1 3 Works at Esperitu Santo bay, Florida -4 Works at Appalachicola bay, Florida - 1,000,000 5 Works at Appalachee bay, Florida - -
6 Works at St. Joseph's bay, Florida - - j 7 Works at Santa Rosa bay, Florida - -
8 Works to cover navy-yard at Pensacola - - 200,000 
9 Works at Perdido bay, Alabama - - - 200,000 
10 Fort at Dauphin i land Mobile bay, Alabama I - 880,000 
5,280,000 
·41 
ST ATEMEiNT 2-P,ontinued~ 
Recapitulation. 
.A. Old forts and batte;ries - -
C; Fortificaii~ns u~der construction -
E. Works io be const~cted after those in D, 0£ ~tate-
, ment 1, are completed - - - -
) 
F. Works to .·be last. COJ!lmenced 
' 







Report from , the Ordnance 'Department, in; answer to a resolution of the 
Senate relative to the defences of the country. 
OR,DNANCE OFFICE, 
' Washington, June 21, 1841. 
Sm: On the subject of the Senate's resolution of the 3d of March last, rel-
ative to the defence of the yountry, which was referred ,by you tq this office, 
I have the honor , to report: A resolution of the same tenor, .and (with tp.e 
exception of the 7th paragraph) in the same words, was adopted by the Sen-
ate on the 2d of March, 1839. The subject was referred to 4 board of offi-
cers, whose report is printed in the Senate doc. No. 451 of the 1st session, 
26th Congress. To that repo1t I beg .leave to. _refer for. an answer to such 
parts of the present resolution as relate to this department, and from it the 




Statement of the amount of ordnance, ordnance stores, '5'"c., on hand and required . 
. 
Seacoast from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida. Heavy Field Heavy Field Shot and Powder (lbs). 
cannon. cannon. carriages. carriages. shells. 
~ 
{Required . 1,040 57 1,040 57 109,700 878,800 
Old forts and batteries, table A .. - - On hand - 894 57 681 57 98,755 878,800 
To be provided 146 - 359 - 10,945 -
---{Required · 322 14 322 14 33,600 205,800 
New f'orti.fications completed, table B - - On hand - 190 14 153 14 24,848 60,170 
To be provided 132 - 169 - 8,752 145,630 
---
!Required - . 2,254 33 2,254 33 228,700 1,616,300 
Fortifications under construction, table C - - On hand - 1,309 33 257 33 122,000 -
- l To be provided 945 - 1,997 - 106,700 1,616,300 ---
!Required - 1,249 23 1,249 23 127,700 874,300 
Fortifications to be first commenced, table D - On hand - 738 23 - 23 22,320 -
l To be provided ---511 - 1,249 - 105,480 .. 874,300 
{Required - 717 39 717 39 75,600 471,300 
Fortifications to be next constructed, table E - On hand - 24 39 - 39 7,954 -
To be provided 683 - 717 - 67,646 471,300 . ' ---{Required · 4,651 139 4,651 139 479,000 3,388,750 
~ortifications to be last constructed, table F - On hand :. 86 139 - 139 33,400 -
To be provided 4,565 -· 4,651 - 445,600 3,388,750 
Cost of stores to 
be provided. 
$210,937 6 
134,095 C 0 
1,465,435 ( 0 
889,111 I 0 






Gulf of Mexico, from Cape Florida to the Sabine. 
{Required . 66 3 
Old forts and batteries, table A On hand - 45 3 - - -
-l To be provided 21 -
' 
· { Required - 520 12 
New fortifications completed, table B On hand - 306 
12 -
To be provided 214 -
. ' 
[Required - 175 6 
Fortifications under construction, table C -
On hand - 124 6 -
l To be provided 51 -
i Required - 12 -
Works to be constructed after those in table D, state- On hand - 2 -
ment I, are completed, table E - - - l To be provided 10 -
J Required - 903 25 
Works to be last commenced, table F On hand - 21 25 - -
l To be provided 882 -
Western frow;ier, from the Sabine to Lake Superior - - - 12 139 
Northern frontier, from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy - - 375 180 
Total to be provided - -.:; - 8,547 319 
66 3 6,900 
37 3 6,000 
29 - 900 
520 12 53,200 
228 12 37,600 
292 - 15,600 
175 6 18,100 
13 6 9,815 
162 - 8,285 
12 - 1,200 
- - 400 
12 - 800 
903 25 92,800 . 
- 25 10,400 
903 - 82,400 
12 139 15,100 
375 180 55,500 
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In reply to the. 7th paragraph of tb,e resolution, I beg leave to. pr~sent a 
copy of a report made to the Secretary of War in Febr4ary last, showm.g t1?-e 
greatest amount' of funds which could be beneficially expended ~nually 1n 
this department in preparations for the national defence. W ork1!1g at the 
rate there stated, it would require_ !;lbOQt twenty-five years kt pmv1d_~_ all the· 
armament for the for,ti&cat~ons embrµce<;l in the projected sy~tem of 1d~fence; 
but it is to be remarked that mor~ than qne halj of that quantity ~o ht; pro-
vided, is fo1 the fortifipations on the seaboard embraced in table F, qesignated 
as those to be last constmcted, and which would probably be built at a very 
distant day. . 
Very respectf-qlly, your opedie:nt seryant, 
G. BOMFORD, 
Hon. JOHN BELL, 
Secretary of1 War. 
Colonel of Or<fnance. 
ORDNANCE OFFICE, 
Washington, February 19, 1841. 
Sm: Herewith I have the honor to submit a brief statement of) the_ ord-
nance and ordnanqe stores, that may be readily provided . d~ri~g the, present 
year, together with an estimate of the cost of. the same, amounting, in round 
numbers, to one million of dollars; should it be required, a statement in de-
tail will be promptly prepared. 
I~ is pr?per to state _t)lat the operative means of this departi;nent, in con -
nex10n with the pubhc arsenals and the private foundries and workshops, 
ar~ f'":ly adequate to prepare during the present year, advantageously, &nd at 
fair pnces, at least one half of the ordnance and ordnance stores enumerated 
~n the accompanying statement. These means can also be much extended 
m the course of the year, should the public service demand it. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
G. BOMFORD, 
Hon. J. R. POINSETT, 
Secretary of War. 
Colonel of Ordnance. 
Estimate of the probable amount of funds tltat can be advantageously ex-
pended, per annum, by the Ordnance Department, for procuring can-
non, carriages, cannon-shot, artillery, and other equipments, tc., o/C, 
For 600 heavy cannon, including 10 and 8 inch heavy 
howitzers, averaged at $450 each - - -
" 300 heavy gun carriages and equipments, at $400 each -
" 150 bronze field guns, averaged at $400 each - -
" 100 iron " " " 120 " 








For cannou, shot, shells, &c., the supply 0f which may be 
increased to quadruple the amount 
" 2,000 sets of accoutrements for infantry and rifle, at $3 84 
each 
" 500 sets of artillery harness, complete, at $80 50 each -
" 20,000 sets of cavalry equipments, complete, at $12 each-, 
" 2,000 sets of horse " " " 32 " 
" timber for 1,000 gun carriages, at $30 each 
" iron for 1,000 " " 60 " 
"' saltpetre, $25,000, sulphur, $5,000, and gunpowder, 
37,950 
[ 2] 
$100,000 
76,800 
40,250 
24,000 
64,000 
30,000 
60,000 
67,950 
$1,000,000 
